



Thung Ju-Lan

1996/1997 Conflict in West Kalimantan: A Historical Recollection

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*This book is dedicated to the memory
of Prof. Khoo Khay Jin
as a friend and a teacher:*

*“To the time we shared when this book
was just a scramble”*

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Publisher's Note

As an academic publisher, BRIN Publishing bears the responsibility to continually strive to provide high-quality scientific publications. This effort is a manifestation of BRIN Publishing's duty to participate in developing superior human resources and advancing the intellectual life of the nation, as mandated in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution.

The 1996/1997 Conflict in West Kalimantan: A Historical Recollection provides a critical examination of the tragic communal violence between the Dayak, Malay, and Madurese communities during the end of Indonesia's New Order regime. Utilizing Frances Stewart's framework of horizontal inequalities, this book investigates the socio-economic, political, and cultural dimensions underlying the bloodshed. This book also challenges prevailing cultural explanations by highlighting systemic issues, including transmigration policies, natural resource exploitation, and the marginalizing effects of local political restructuring. By presenting empirical data, this book offers profound insights into the complex interactions between ethnic identity and state policy.

We hope that this book will serve as a valuable reading reference to broaden the insights and knowledge of all its readers, especially for researchers and students interested in conflict studies, horizontal inequalities, and the political history of West Kalimantan. Finally,

we would like to express our gratitude to everyone who has assisted in the publication process of this book.

BRIN Publisher

Foreword

This carefully written monograph on communal conflict in West Kalimantan that flare up more than two decades ago, as correctly said by its writer to be a historical recollection. The communal conflict, often described as ethnic conflict between the Madurese, the settlers, and the Dayak, the locals, is an interesting social event as it occurred a year before the end of Suharto's New Order regime in May 1998. This tragic event, therefore, can not be easily described as other communal conflicts that have occurred after the collapse of the authoritarian government, which are generally perceived as a violent outbreak after the lid of a boiling pot of water is lifted.

This monograph is written by Dr Ju-Lan Thung, a senior researcher at the Research Centre for Society and Culture of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, which, since September 2020, was liquidated and merged into a single large institute, the National Institute for Research and Innovation, in which all government research institutes are now put under one roof. As the research institute is shifting toward more bureaucratic and pressing researchers to publish in international journals, Ju-Lan Thung perhaps belongs to the last generation of scholars that survived.

As part of a larger collaborative research project under the leadership of Frances Stewart at CRISE Oxford University, the theoretical underpinning is what Frances Stewart developed as

horizontal inequalities, an inequality between different ethnic and cultural identities. Horizontal inequality is a new approach that looks beyond merely economic differences, as it has also adopted anthropology, sociology, and politics to construct a composite inequality index. As an economist, Frances Stewart, primarily based on her study in Africa, attempted to correct the conventional econometric approach to communal conflict while avoiding Marxist class-based analysis that is slowly being replaced by more cultural analysis.

Ethnicity, in a broader sense, seems a common platform, often subtly interwoven with the notion of territory and religion, transforming the current political organization and making it complicated to untangle. The central position of ethnicity, in various forms of social and political conflicts, puts Indonesia, perhaps, in a comparable situation to that experienced previously in Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the Cold War. Yet, as Maybury-Lewis (1997, ix) notes: Ethnicity is one of their obscurest issues. In spite of the fact that there is much talk nowadays about ethnicity and ethnic groups, it is not always clear exactly what that means or why ethnicity should have such a powerful hold on human imagination and behaviour. Ethnic conflict has supplanted communism as the spectre that is haunting the world. Writers, commentators, and newspapers are currently telling us that people are everywhere giving in to the primordial urge to band together with others like themselves and to harass or kill those who are different. [See Maybury-Lewis, David. 1997. *Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Groups and the State. Cultural Survival Studies in Ethnicity and Change*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon]

What is written by Marybury-Lewis in 1997 has been continuously ringing in our ears, as within the last three decades, indeed, ethnicity, manifested in the so-called politics of identity and the resurgence of populism, has transformed the world into the current situation. In Indonesia, the postcolonial discourse on

ethnicity has been developing in tandem with the increasing state domination of society. Although the national motto “Unity in Diversity” is constantly propagated, the state repeatedly emphasizes the importance of cultural uniformity and disregards ethnic plurality. The idea of national integration, an obsession of the ruling elites, has strongly influenced the construction of differences and heterogeneity as a perceived national threat. Such a threat, again in the perception of the ruling elites has to be eliminated to achieve the imagined national unity. Assimilation and harmony, two keywords translated into state policies and programs, must be designed to realize national integration and economic prosperity.

The data of this monograph, which was collected around 2000 as the primary basis for the analysis, should be seen within social and political contexts of the conflict, again interestingly at nearly the end of the New Order’s authoritarian regime. The data, a combination of interviews and statistics, is post facto as generally conducted in social sciences and humanities. As argued by the writer, the merit of this monograph is a lesson learned for the new generation of researchers if they want to revisit the study.

This monograph is appropriately dedicated posthumously by the author to the late Khoo Khay Jin, a Malaysian research scholar cum activist who is well known for his succinct and critical understanding of society and acting at the time as a consultant for this project. Finally, as a former coordinator of the CRISE/Oxford-PMB-LIPI collaborative research project, I would like to congratulate Dr. Ju-Lan Thung for her achievement in completing this important and concise monograph.

Bogor, 10 May 2024

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo

Preface

This study was conducted two decades ago, in the 2000s, and could not be published in a book for various reasons. Today, under the consideration that the study might provide an elaborated insight to the relationship between conflict and socioeconomic, political and cultural aspects of societal development at a local and regional level, has motivated the writer to publish it as a historical resource book that could perhaps enable those who have much concern about conflict studies to continue this study into a deeper level of analysis.

This study was part of a collaboration project with CRISE-Oxford University (Prof. Francis Stewart), which focused on horizontal inequalities with Kalimantan as the sole study location. As a beginner in conflict studies, in writing this report, three researchers from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, namely Herry Yogaswara, Laksmi Rachmawati, and I, were supervised by a senior researcher from Malaysia, the late Prof. Khoo Khay Jin¹. We should thank him for his scrutinizing diligence that has helped us, at least myself to write the manuscript in a systematic and comprehensive manner. I also have to thank Andri W.P., who helped me collect additional data while writing of the manuscript. Without Andri W.P., we could not support our proposition and argument on horizontal inequalities.

1 See "In memoriam: Khoo Khay Jin", <https://m.aliran.com/towering-msians/in-memori-am-khoo-khay-jin/>. Accessed on March 27, 2024.

It was quite an interesting experience to study violent conflict at a time when only a few papers were written on conflict in Indonesia. Today, we might find that many papers have been written on conflict issues. Still, this book might provide a particular insight into violent conflict because it was written with a very clear and strict framework that is rarely found in other studies. Horizontal inequalities are often discussed as the underlying reasons for conflicts, but to actually collect empirical data to prove those inequalities, our work might be the first.

The manuscript in this book is my sole responsibility as the writer. Herry Yogaswara and Laksmi Rachmawati wrote different parts of Kalimantan that were not published in this book. I sincerely hope this book will be useful for young scholars interested in the history of conflict and its ramifications in West Kalimantan.

Jakarta, 16 April 2024

Author

Conflict and Its Causes: A Conceptual Framework

A. Introduction

In this work, we focus on the issue of ethnicity and horizontal inequalities, as well as the connection of these two variables as a likely cause of conflict, to re-examine the Sanggau Ledo and Sambas conflicts in West Kalimantan.

Talking about ethnicity and horizontal inequalities as the cause of conflict, we could refer to Frances Stewart's theory that horizontal disparities among social groups—in this case, including ethnic groups—could create gaps that led to serious conflict when accumulated over the years (Stewart, 2005). She argues that “Because of their effectiveness as a binding and mobilising agent, shared identities [including ethnic identities] are an element in many violent conflicts. Nonetheless, cultural differences *alone* are not sufficient to explain violent struggles because such differences only become salient when other differences (political/economic) are present” (Stewart, 2005:167; *italic in the original*). She might be right in stating it because, for example, Giring (2004a)'s

explanation of West Kalimantan conflicts through analysing the Dayak and the Madurese inter-relation experiences, particularly the image of Madurese in the eyes of the Dayak Kanayatn of Salatiga Village, Mandor Sub-district, Landak District—located about 90 km from Pontianak City—which could be categorized as “cultural explanation”, the most prevalent explanation of Dayak-Madurese clashes, fell flat at the end. After all, it failed to explain why the Dayaks respond submissively and agreeably to the outside’s influence. According to him, a long history of “negative” knowledge developed by the Dayaks concerning the Madurese since 1950, particularly in relation to the [Madurese] culture of violence, has created a prejudiced attitude among the Dayaks, albeit they mostly decided to avoid them, or distributed fear to others; only a few fought back (Giring, 2004a:82–104). Therefore, he believes that,

Violence by Dayak Kanayatn is not fully inherent in their culture, but as a result of a long history of sociocultural relationships with outside elements. So the violence of the Dayak Kanayatn is also outsiders’ violence (Giring, 2004a:154–155, translated by the writer).

He thinks the problem does not lie with the Dayak and the Dayak culture, but somewhere else, that is, on the ‘outsider(s)’ or the non-Dayak, namely the Madurese. Perhaps this is similar to the perceived ‘cultural differences’ between the Dayak and the Madurese as argued by other observers, such as Saad (2003). According to him, those ‘cultural differences’ were noticeable in the Madurese’s “perceived habits of rudeness, violent acts, killings, arrogance, anarchy, as well as the want always to win” (Saad, 2003:78 & 80). These, for him, were the essential factors causing conflict between the Madurese and the Malay in Sambas.

Purwana (2003a) found out that previously the incidents between the Dayak and the Madurese¹ had occurred at least ten times, starting in 1950. There were at least nine occasions that they could be categorized as ethnic violence (not individual) between Dayak and Madurese, mostly taken place in the districts of Sambas and Pontianak (now subdivided into Bengkayang and Landak as well).² At first, he seemed to agree with the general opinion about the Madurese's "cultural exclusivism" as the main factor that created tensions and conflicts which led to collective violence between themselves and the Dayak, and later with the Malay (Purwana, 2003a, 52). However, he did not elaborate it further. Not one of the nine occasions mentioned earlier was between Malay and Madurese, except for the 1999 conflict in Sambas. It seems that the latter conflict had no precedent.

However, Purwana later contradicted his own opinion by agreeing with Loekman Soetrisno's argument about structural tensions that were originated from injustice experienced by local people in economic, political and social fields, as well as by combining it with Johan Galtung's theory about collective violence (Purwana,

1 Sudagung (2001) also reported a fight between Dayak and Madurese in Toho Sub-district, Pontianak District in 1968, in Samalantan Sub-district, Sambas District in 1979, which was followed by Sandoreng Incident in Salamantan at the end of the same year. The last incident spread to Sungai Petai, Kampung Montrado, Kampung Benawi Bhakti, Kampung Koncir, Kampung Conde, Kampung Pasuk Kayung, and finally to Kampung Marga Mulia, the strongest "defense" of Madurese in Samalantan.

2 The conflict between Dayak and Madurese mostly occurred in Salamantan (1950, 1978, and 1983), while the last one (in 1996/97) has moved further up to Sanggau Ledo. The second biggest record of violent conflict between Dayak and Madurese was in Landak, which was part of the District of Pontianak before it was established as a separate district in 2000. The areas of conflict covered Tarap and Toho in 1967/68, Sungai Pinyuh in 1976 and 1979, Sungai Ambawang in 1993, and 1997 (place not clear), reported as a spillover from Siantan and Sambas. In Pontianak District itself, in 1997, a conflict broke out, like in Landak and Sanggau, according to one source, as a spillover from Siantan and Sambas. Still, actually, there is no record about violence in Siantan and Sambas in 1997, because the only conflict recorded for 1997 is the Sanggau Ledo conflict of 1996–1997. Instead, there was a record of previous violence between Dayak and Madurese in Pontianak District in 1994.

2003a, 10). He makes a proposition about “structural violence in Sambas”, which covers the issue of the relationship between central and local governments which is mostly based on economic growth, the problem of recruitment and promotion in bureaucratic positions which is highly centralized, issues of democratization and reformation which created a transitional government, the economic marginalization of local people or the native through HPH (*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan* - Forest Logging Concession)³, *Tata Niaga Jeruk* (Orange commerce), etc., which was accompanied by *preman*-ism, as well as the [historical] fact that the relationship between military and the local people which was built up through repressive security approach since the time of PGRS/Paraku movement of the 1960s, resulting in the creation of a paramilitary group such as FKPM (*Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu* -Communication Forum for Malays Youngsters) (Purwana, 2003a, 85–104). Unfortunately, most of his arguments were not presented with supporting details, except for a rather vague ‘ethnic jealousy’ found in the following statement of his:

Although the centre of violent conflict between ethnic groups is not found around land conflict areas, the conflicts themselves were presented as a concrete experience in front of the local people through their social interaction with the Madurese in their everyday lives. In all segments of the market and jobs in West Kalimantan and Sambas District in particular, the Madurese could be found working as construction labour, boat drivers, motorcycle rental, becak drivers, farmers, small to large scale traders, businessmen, and even several structural positions within local government. Moreover, in sectors that were considered ‘prosperous’, such as labour recruitment, inter-island log, orange, and cattle

3 For this particular issue, also read Purwana (2023b)”.

trading activities, and many big shops in Sambas market, the Madurese also control quite a larger share, so that they are often labelled as “black Chinese” (Purwana, 2003a, 97, translated by writer).

As he first stated, Purwana—like Frances Stewart—believes the economic and political explanation of conflict rather than on cultural explanation of the Madurese’s exclusivism like he first stated. Nevertheless, we should first make a note of the fact that, while resource competition is a likely contributing factor, it is not evident that the groups in conflict are also the ones engaged directly in resource competition, particularly since the Madurese, the main victims, were themselves generally lower income and poor. Even if some of the alleged (Madurese) leaders—specifically office bearers of the ethnic association—may have been important economic actors, the acknowledged low socioeconomic status of the Madurese themselves has become a reason for a majority of participants and local observers interviewed to reject “outsider” comments that the conflicts were a result of economic jealousy or economic inequalities. That is perhaps one of the reasons why cultural explanation becomes prevalent.

In line with Purwana’s argument of “structural violence”, Giring (2004b) also claimed that the main cause of violence between Dayak and Madurese is the state, from the colonial era up to the New Order period, and in this case, he emphasizes, without further elaboration, issue of the New Order’s authoritarianism, capital expansion and militarism (Giring, 2004b:50–55). As he said,

Dayak’s violent action in the 1996/97 case was forced by a big power that could not be separated from Dayak’s relations with the government in the colonial era up to the New Order era, with capital holders and Dayak individuals themselves who were standing behind the capital holders. In other

words, the rulers' authoritarianism and capitalism expansion participated in creating factual condition which formed attitudes and actions of the Dayak people. It means that the Dayaks and Madurese are both the victims. Thus, essentially, the violence of the Dayaks and Madurese is the violence that comes from outside (Giring, 2004b:55, quoted like the original text).

This kind of political argument, which focuses on the state's violence, was carried further by Jamie Seth Davidson, who conducted historical research for his dissertation (published in 2009). Davidson tried to explain ethnic violence in West Kalimantan through the construction of the political history of the region's relationship with the central government in Jakarta, as he strongly argued,

West Kalimantan is a critical case in studying Indonesia's extensive regional violence. Only West Kalimantan experienced non-separatist, collective violence that traversed the entirety of the New Order. Episodes ranged from the ethnic cleansing of Chinese and the first serious Dayak-Madurese clash in late 1967, minor Madurese-Dayak incidents of the 1970s and 1980s, to the great explosion of 1997 (Davidson, 2009, 1).

In explaining why the 1997 clash was significantly more expansive than previous Madurese-Dayak turmoils, Davidson stresses the changing political environment of Dayak society-state relations as the key factor. He situates the outburst at, if we use his own words, "the confluence of two broader yet complementary political forces: the Dayak resurgence and the local politics of regional autonomy" (Davidson, 2009, 4) . By referring to a similar experience in the past during the 1967 PGRS/Paraku Incident, Davidson seems to assume that, like previously happened, the Dayak resurgence for power was responsible for the outbreak of violence in

1997, and that the level of 1997 violence was larger in scale due to the problem of decentralization that took place at the same time. If his argument is correct, perhaps it would be very significant to observe political changes that take place at the regional level after the 1997/99 conflict, particularly in relation to the Dayak struggle for power, like he suggested. We will return to this issue in the later sections.

Davidson's approach is rather similar to that of Heidhues (2001), who believes that "the historical roots of violence link the outbreaks of 1997...to the terror that gripped part of the province thirty years previously, and to even earlier ethnic conflict during the 19th century" (Heidhues, 2001:139). She argued that "[b]ecause the victims were dissimilar—in earlier cases they were ethnic Chinese—and because the earlier events are not well known, few have connected these apparently disparate events, *yet they took place within the same limited space and for some of the same reason*" (Heidhues, 2001, 139; emphasis added). Based on her observation, "[t]he center of anti-Madurese terror was in the very areas where Chinese has been expelled thirty years previously⁴", therefore Heidhues concludes that "[i]n 1997, it seems, the Dayaks were reasserting their claim to this strategic area" (Heidhues, 2001, 146). However, since she also pointed out that "the Dayak-Madurese violence of 1997 preceded both the financial crisis and the great smog" (Heidhues, 2001, 150, fn. 41), her interpretation of the Dayak's motivation is quite speculative because why the Dayak would suddenly want to reassert their claim?

4 "In October-November 1967, Dayaks stormed into Chinese markets and villages, especially in Kabupaten Sambas and Pontianak ... The hardest hit areas were Anjungan, center of a farming and market gardening area (as well as a crossroads governing communications with Bengkayang to the north and Mandor to the south), considered the best agricultural area in the province, Menjalin, with a large Chinese market, Mandor, the old Lanfang Kongsì headquarters, Toho, and Karangan" (Heidhues, 2001, 143). These areas which were known as "the former Chinese districts", i.e. the old *kongsì* area along the coast between Pontianak and the Sarawak border, belonging to the districts of Montrado (later Singkawang) and Sambas, with Anjungan-Mentidung as its center, in 1997, "of all places where Dayaks and Madurese meet, became the center of violence—the same place in which the Dayaks attacked the Chinese years before" (Heidhues, 2001, 140–141).

Perhaps in this case, Bertrand (2004) is right to suggest that “the New Order’s institutional structure has resulted in the “Dayak’s exclusion from political and economic benefits from development”, and the “state’s alteration of the rules of access to resources” in particular “has caused the Dayak discontent” (Bertrand, 2004, 49). Therefore, he believes that “violent identities among Dayak and Madurese communities were produced as a consequence of New Order policies”. He gathers that, although the Madurese were “never the most important migrant group in numerical terms”, but they became “the most visible”, particularly since they organized themselves in separate communities.

B. Ethnicity and Horizontal Inequalities

Our work shows that we could not totally ignore the importance of economic factors as a contributing one. The case of the Sanggau Ledo conflict shows that horizontal inequality, which resulted in the marginalization of the Dayak, might be the cause of the Dayak’s violence. That case also indicates—even though rather faintly—that economic jealousy might play a role in igniting the violence against the Madurese in that area.

Jawai’s population density is the second highest after Pemangkat, while Tebas is on the third rank, so perhaps we could safely assume “density” as one of the underlying factors that facilitate the outbreak of violence in Sambas District. According to some informants, Sanggau Ledo was one of the Madurese concentration areas before the 1996/1997 violent clash, which, together with Samalantan and Monterado Sub-districts,⁵ were the only places in Bengkayang District that we could find Madurese in a rather significant number;

5 According to Alep Gompeng (*ex-asisten wedana* of Salamantan, he was a *camat* during our interview in 2000), since 1964 there were many Madurese living in Samalantan and Monterado, even in a small “rather well into the interior” sub-village called Benawa at Monterado. Samalantan and Monterado are closed to Singkawang, the second largest city after

while outside these three areas, there were fewer than 10 Madurese only. According to Sudagung (2001), Madurese settlement in Sanggau Ledo and Salamantan, as inland area of Sambas District, was started around 1939 (Sudagung, 2001, 71). Sanggau Ledo itself is located 100 to 150 km to the northeast Singkawang, and to reach the place we have to pass three other sub-districts, including Samalantan, so it is rather not clear why the Madurese chose Sanggau Ledo as one of their concentration area, particularly since other places that might be a better choice if their consideration is economy and market, such as Bengkayang, or Ledo for a similarity in Muslim culture. Both of them are closer to Singkawang than Sanggau Ledo. As a matter of fact, either at Bengkayang or at Ledo (i.e., at Magmagan), according to some informants, we could find only a small number of Madurese prior to the clash. We could only guess that perhaps the reason for the Madurese to choose Sanggau Ledo was due to the fact that since 1974, there were many Javanese Muslims living in the area brought about by several kinds of transmigration programs, such as *transau*, *transos*, *trans paket*, or outside transmigrants with inserted local people. Their number became even larger after applying the Trans-PIR (*Perkebunan karet Inti Rakyat*) program from PTP VII in 1980/1981.

The 1996/1997 violence started at Ledo—close to Ledo market—but the attacks toward the Madurese the day after were directed to Sanggau Ledo. It is perhaps because at Ledo and its surrounding area, there was relatively no Madurese worthy of group attacks. According to some informants, the Madurese mostly lived along the street (which stretched between Bengkayang–Seluas, and was

Pontianak, and this is probably the main reason the Madurese chose them as their concentration areas before the conflict. At that time, they had interacted quite well with the Dayak and the Chinese. Several informants also mentioned about another sub-village in Samalantan which became the concentration area of the Madurese before the 1979 Dayak–Madurese's Salamantan incident, but we could not be sure whether the sub-village they mentioned is Jirak sub-village which was reported as where the 1979 incident started. The problem to identify the aforementioned sub-village is due to the regrouping of village, which took place in 1989.

asphalted since 1981) on the border between Ledo and Sanggau Ledo (Bange' Village, which consists of Jawai Sub-district⁶, Pandan Sub-district, etc.) up to the center for market activities in Sanggau Ledo (Lembang Village), which covers Ngadan, Ciremai, and Kampung Jawa in the middle. Therefore, land properties, which were left behind by the Madurese, were mostly located at Sanggau Ledo, besides Samalantan and Monterado. Data received by Kalimantan Review from Sinar Tebudak, Bange, Gua, and Lembang Villages, indicates that the property left behind by the Madurese was 349 pieces, with 279 with certificate of ownership and the rest only a land statement (*Surat Pernyataan Tanah* or SPT, and *Surat Keterangan Tanah* or SKT) (Kalimantan Review No. 61, 2000, 12). It obviously supports information provided by Andi W. P.'s informants that the Madurese who became refugees in 1997 clash were thousands, because if we assume that each family has five members, so at least there was a total of 1745 Madurese. According to informants, the Madurese acquired those lands in two ways. Firstly, through utilizing "sleeping land" owned by nobody, with the local leader's permission only, this method was mostly done by the first generation of Madurese who came in a small number. Some informants believe that this "sleeping land" was actually the land that was left behind by the Chinese after the 1967 anti-Chinese riots. Secondly, through a buying process, which was generally done by the second and third generations of Madurese. The Madurese worked almost all kinds of jobs, from farmer to stone-breaker.

Even though there were some minor conflicts between the Dayak and the Madurese in relation to the issue of land boundaries, they could not be considered as the root cause of the 1996/1997 violent clash, as commonly perceived, because a similar conflict happened between the Madurese and the Malay, as well as between the Dayak

6 The Parit Setia village at the Jawai sub-district (Sambas District) was the location of 1999, January 17th Incident known as the Idul Fitri Tragedy.

and the Malay. Another informant believed that the root cause of the conflict was the strengthened economic capabilities of the Madurese, which brought about jealousy from the Dayak, as Purwana suggested before. But, it is rather difficult to prove, except if we consider the present condition of the Javanese in Sanggau Ledo, whose activities and property rights were now relatively restricted by the Dayak. The Javanese have to have strong evidence of their ownership; otherwise, their right over the land would be taken over by the local Dayaks, arguing that the land is their native land. The Javanese, too, are pessimistic that the head of Sanggau Ledo Sub-district, which the Javanese mostly occupy, could be of Javanese origin. Some even believe that to become the head of a neighborhood (*ketua RT*) is also impossible for a Javanese. A Javanese informant said he also lost his chance to become a schoolmaster, even though he is the most senior teacher in that school, because he is not a “native son”.

The jealousy theory might also stick if the famous Madurese figure in Sanggau Ledo, SL, symbolized the Madurese’s economic success. According to some informants, SL had several public transportation operated between Pontianak and Sanggau Ledo, and his buses were in a much larger number than those owned by Muksih from Package D (Javanese) Transmigrant of Sinar Tebudak at the moment, i.e. eight buses⁷. However, we could never be sure about the validity of such a theory because the theory itself is mostly created or written down after the incident.

Since our work was initiated by taking Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequalities as our main framework, we organized the following chapters accordingly. Her hypotheses, as mentioned before, are that “because of their effectiveness as a binding and mobilising agent, shared identities [including ethnic identities] are an element in many violent conflicts. Nonetheless, cultural differences *alone* are

7 Sudagung (2001) also reported that at the time of his study, which was in 1983, there were successful Madurese in Sanggau Ledo; they ran a restaurant (Sudagung, 2001:148).

not sufficient to explain violent struggles because such differences only become salient when other differences (political/economic) are present” (Stewart, 2005:167; italic in the original). For that reason, we position our explanation about economic differences between conflicting ethnic groups in Chapter III after the chronology of events (Sanggau Ledo and Sambas riots) in Chapter II, followed by discussing ethnic issues within the local politics realm of West Kalimantan in Chapter IV. We started with the socio-economic context of the Dayak-Madurese conflict because many previous studies argued that economic competition between Madurese and other ethnic groups led to violent conflict. We explore the possibility of competition within the political sphere to compare whether political issues are more dominant than economic issues in the relationship between those conflicting ethnic groups, which might lead to violent conflict. We discuss Dayak marginalization’s social and cultural aspects in **Chapter V** because we believe. However, it might not be a dominant element in violent conflict in West Kalimantan; it could still show some connections to the conflict. We also look at the Ketapang case in Chapter VI to see why the relationship between Madurese and Dayak-Malay in that area, unlike Sanggau Ledo and Sambas, did not lead to violent conflict. And finally, in the last chapter, Chapter VII, we tried to link horizontal inequalities and conflict prevention to find how our work could contribute to the conflict resolution or transformation.


Chronology of Events

A. Sanggau Ledo Riot⁸

On December 29th 1996, a Madurese stabbed two Dayak youths in Ledo, as revenge for a beating on December 6th, which was originally provoked by an allegation of sexual harassment of a Dayak girl. When after their ultimatum of 24 hours to the Ledo police to arrest the responsible Madurese had passed without any result, the families of the stabbed Dayaks, together with many others, went to Transos Lembang, Merabu Sub-village (about five km from Sanggau Ledo) to look for the responsible Madurese. Almost at the same time, several hundred Dayaks began to attack and burn Madurese houses between Ledo and Sanggau Ledo because they heard a rumor that the two Dayaks had died. In the afternoon, more people from Lumar to Sanggau Ledo. Within two days, the riots had spread to Bengkayang, Samalantan (Jirak, Sindu, Sei Petak, Margamulya, Monterado, Simpang Terado, and Sansibo Sub-village), Nyarumkop, Pajintan, and Bagak at Tujuh Belas Sub-district, then continued to Pangmilang, Roban, Kulor, and Sagatani (Singkawang) (see Figure 2.1

8 As summarized from Kalimantan Review (No. 20, 1997, 36–45).

for the mapping of Sanggau Ledo riot's dispersion). Some Madurese retaliated, but others sought refuge in military posts, and later were taken to Asrama Haji Pontianak. After the police implemented curfew between 21.00 and 04.00 and did a roadblock on January 2nd, gradually the mass started to calm down. Madurese refugees were recorded to reach 5.115 people⁹. By January 6th, 1997, the situation had returned to normal, even though tensions remained till the end of January. Afterwards, in those various places, peace agreements were carried out, followed by the Bupati Sambas' announcement to control the situation.



Source: West Kalimantan map as modified by the writer.

Figure 2.1. Dispersion of Sanggau Ledo Riot in West Kalimantan

⁹ According to Kalimantan Review's record, the number of refugee was 6.373 people (Kalimantan Review, No. 68, 2001, 13).

On January 29th, fueled by rumors of the attacks on Madurese houses and mosque, a group of Madurese attacked a Catholic boarding school (Asisi Junior and Senior High School, Pontianak). They stabbed two Dayak girls, followed by the murder of Pak Nyangkut, a Dayak Tebas in Peniraman (Kalimantan Review No. 68, 2001, 13). The stabbing and the murder had started an extensive and deadly war between Dayak and Madurese, which lasted for almost two weeks. At one time, the Dayaks killed 131 Madurese and burnt all of their houses in Salatiga. The violence that took place mostly in three districts (Sambas/Bengkayang, Sanggau, and Pontianak/Landak) has resulted in about 500 people killed and more than 20,000 Madurese displaced.

B. Sambas Riot¹⁰

It started as a fight and became the biggest ethnic conflict between Malays and Madurese. It caused 200 people to be killed, 60.000 Madurese to become refugees¹¹, thousands of houses and vehicles to be burnt or destroyed, and thousands of animals to be slaughtered (Kalimantan Review No. 68, 2001, 13). The fight started in Setia Dharma Sub-village, Parit Setia Village at Jawai Sub-district at midnight on Sunday, January 17th 1999, when a Madurese from Sari Makmur Sub-village, Rambeyan Village at Tebas Sub-district, who was alleged to be a thief, received a beating from men around the Malay house he had broken into. On Tuesday afternoon, he returned with a group of approximately 200 Madurese to attack the people at Parit Setia and killed three people. The incident was stopped with unsatisfying decisions for both sides through the interference of the police and military commanders, who held a peace ceremony on January 23rd.

10 As summarized from Bambang H. Suta Purwana, (2004, 3–11).

11 According to Kalimantan Review (No. 75, 2001, 18), there were 58.453 or 11.600 households (Madurese) refugees at *Asrama Haji* Pontianak without a very clear future



Source: West Kalimantan map as modified by the writer.

Figure 2.2. Dispersion of the Sambas Riot in West Kalimantan

On February 21st, 1999, an incident occurred in Tebas between a Madurese unwilling to pay the fare and a driver assistant, who was later assisted by other Malay men gathered in Semparuk's Village market. Later the Madurese returned, stopped the bus, and hurt the driver's assistant. The news spread all over Sambas, saying that the driver assistant was killed, so a group of people (about 300 people) came to the Madurese's house in Senggobang Sub-village, Sempadaung Village, to force him to surrender himself to the police. Still, a shot came from the house and hurt a Malay, who joined the group. News of his death soon spread in the Pemangkat area, particularly at Semparuk Village. Since that early morning

of February 22nd, mass riots started with the burning of Madurese houses in Semparuk, Kelambu, and Penjajab Villages. The burning of houses continued to all Madurese houses in Tebas Sub-district, and armed fights between Malays and Madurese occurred in several places. On February 23rd 1999 another fight broke out in Tebas Village between Malay and Madurese, with the Malay outnumbered the Madurese. The fight was followed by the burning of Madurese houses in the area, which later spread to the neighboring districts: Pemangkat, Jawai, and Sambas, including seaside villages in the inland area of the Sambas District. Despite several signed statements of peace as well as the appeal from *Bupati* Sambas on February 24th, the violence continued until finally the provincial police commander ordered a shot on the spot for the rioters. Yet, another incident broke on March 16th, 1999, when a pickup consisting of 21 Dayak and 1 Malay road workers, with a Batak driver, was ambushed by several “Madurese”, resulting in 1 Dayak from Kiawit Village, Salamantan, was killed outside Pemangkat, between Gersik and Pesapakan Villages Afterwards, the Dayak joined hand with the Malays to fight against the Madurese. They ignored the police’s threat of being shot on the spot. The Dayak first burnt Madurese houses in Samalantan and Monterado area, followed by mass riots toward Madurese houses in Jirak Village, Merabu, Kampung Jawa, and surrounding villages (see Figure 2.2 for the mapping of the Sambas riot’s dispersion). The number of deaths was not significant, because the Madurese living in Sanggau Ledo and Samalantan Sub-District had been evacuated to the military air-strip in Sanggau Ledo, as well as to Pontianak City, using police and military vehicles and boats. All of these had caused the economic activities of Tebas, Pemangkat, and Sebangkau on March 18th, 1999, to be halted.

The violence continued until April 1999, which at the end produced a total of 12,472 families or 63,934 displaced people. In Tebas Sub-district, where the violence started, we could find a

population drop of 10.611 people from 81.215 in 1999 to 70.604 in 2001. In Jawai, the sub-district, including Parit Setia, where the conflict first started, the drop in population is 4.445, that is from 58.205 in 1999 to 53.760 in 2001. The decrease in each village in those two sub-districts is as summarised in **Table 2.1**¹²


Table 2.1. Number of Population in Tebas and Jawai Districts by Village in 1999 and 2001

Village Name	Tebas District				Jawai District				Decrease (person)
	Area (km2)	Population in 1999 (person)	Population in 2001 (persons)	Decrease (person)	Village Name	Area (km2)	Population in 1999 (person)	Population in 2001 (persons)	
Serat Ayon	66,64	799	758		Sarang Burung Danau	48,20	3.360	3.579	
Maribas	87,50	709	1.132		Sungai Nilam	18,05	1.626	1.520	106
Bukit Segoler	13,00	2.245	2.244		Sarang Burung Kolam	25,25	3.814	3.885	
Batu Makjage	21,34	2.354	2.404		Sarang Burung Usrat	14,35	2.690	2.996	
Serindang	10,02	2.564	2.777		Sarang Burung Kuala	10,85	2.552	2.428	124
Matang Labung	15,20	2.802	2.896		Pelimpaan	25,00	4.270	4.202	68
Mak Tangguk	6,27	1.961	1.774	187	Parit Setia	10,80	2.548	2.412	136
Segedong	6,30	2.010	1.773	237	Bakau	10,00	3.044	3.061	
Pusaka	8,63	2.983	1.774	1.209	Sungai Nyirih	10,75	2.281	2.145	136
Mensere	4,50	3.010	3.068		Sentebang	12,75	7.323	6.307	1.016
Sungai Kelambu	5,10	2.419	2.427		Dungun Laut	8,50	2.991	2.689	302
Serumpun Buluh	5,60	1.849	1.853		Jawai Laut	22,47	2.044	2.283	
Mekar Sekuntum	7,88	2.400	2.150	250	Jalu Air	18,00	2.292	1.732	560

12 No statistical data on 2000 could be collected.

Pangkalan Kongs	10,50	3.883	2.645	1.238	Matang Terap	5,40	5.367	4.320	1.047
Dungun Perapa-	6,00	1.926	1.581	345	Suah Api	4,25	1.582	1.285	197
kan									
Tebas Sungai	20,00	7.782	7.814		Sarilaba A	5,52	1.679	1.348	331
Tebas Kuala	3,83	5.033	4.995	38	Sarilaba B	4,47	1.394	1.172	222
Mak Rampai	4,25	3.887	2.947	940	Semperluuk A	4,27	1.763	1.601	162
Sejiram	4,50	1.502	1.399	103	Semperluuk B	6,42	2.510	2.248	262
Bekut	5,43	2.335	2.470		Sabaran	22,20	3.065	2.547	518
Sempalai	5,73	2.598	2.203	395					
Seberkat	59,28	1.730	1.883						
Tekarang	9,54	2.088	2.036	52					
Rambayan	10,49	2.085	1.718	367					
Matang Segarau	13,49	2.435	976	1.459					
Segarau Parit	17,44	4.927	3.335	1.592					
Sari Makmur	9,25	2.601	690	1.911					
Sempadian	14,25	4.208	2.900	1.308					
Cepala	9,00	1.983	1.838	145					
Merubung	16,69	2.137	2.144						
Total	477,65	81.215	70.604	10.611	Total	287,50	58.205	53.760	4.445
		(density 170)	(density 148)				(density 202)	(density 187)	

Source: Kecamatan Tebas Dalam Angka Tahun 1999, Kecamatan Tebas Dalam Angka Tahun 2001 (p.19), Kecamatan Jawai Dalam Angka Tahun 1999, and Kecamatan Jawai Dalam Angka Tahun 2001 (p.13).Angka Tahun 2001 (p.13).



Source: Kecamatan Jawai Dalam Angka Tahun 2001 and Kecamatan Tebas Dalam Angka Tahun 2001

Figure 2.3. Jawai Sub-district Map

Meanwhile, at Pemangkat Sub-district—where the biggest and nearest town, Pemangkat Kota, is located—the drop in population is only at two villages, Parit Baru (on the border to Selakau Sub-district, next to Pemangkat Kota) and Seburang (on the border to Tebas Sub-district), that is 331 and 896 respectively (see *Kecamatan Pemangkat Dalam Angka 1999*, 1999:21 and *Kecamatan Pemangkat Dalam Angka 2001*, 2001:22).

C. Pontianak and Landak: A Conflict Spill Over

Both conflicts of 1996/97 and of 1999 had started in the Sambas-Bengkayang District. It was only later that it also took place in the Pontianak-Landak District and Pontianak City, the capital of West Kalimantan province. Therefore, some people argued that conflicts in Pontianak and Landak were not caused by internal factors within the Pontianak-Landak District or Pontianak City itself. Still, they are “conflict spill over” from the Sambas-Bengkayang District.

If we read Davidson (2009)’s work carefully, we should note a history of conflict within Pontianak-Landak District itself, particularly around Mandor and Menjalin area, which went back to the 1967 PGRS/PARAKU movement. Of course, it would; however, it would be difficult to connect the 1996/97 and 1999 conflicts to that of PGRS PARAKU, particularly since the leading actors of the more recent conflicts were mostly young people who do not have much memory about the past conflict, except for, perhaps, what their parents or grandparents had told them.

The Socio-Economic Context of Dayak-Madurese Conflict

A. Dayak's Marginalization

Following Bertrand's aforementioned argument, perhaps it is also right to say that due to the 'cultural differences', or the alleged character and behaviour of the Madurese, they represented the immediate face, the one most ordinary people see, of government policies and practices that had caused the worsening of the economic condition of the "indigenes." The transmigration and employment policies in timber and plantation would be the government policies that most affected the local population¹³. Mering Ngo, a Dayak academic from West Kalimantan now based in Jakarta, for example, in 2003, insisted that Malays had been marginalized by logging and plantation activities, and by transmigration, which, in the 1990s, in particular, has brought in Madurese *preman*-ism (gangsterism) that

13 Since the policies—such as transmigration policy—were mostly designed based on the Javanese experience, they have ignored, among others, local values of land to indigenous groups, and hence created land conflicts.

later fed into ethnic violence. The latter issue is not only justified by the civilians but also by members of the police who stated (during our interview in 2000s) that, “When there were many Madurese in Sambas, the crime rate was high, when they left, it came down”, even though such an assumption was not supported by any evidence.

On various occasions, John Bamba¹⁴, the director of the Institute of Dayakology in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, also maintained that the Dayak have long been marginalized socially, culturally, politically, and economically by the development policies, which destroyed the Dayak’s culture (including self-esteem), land¹⁵ & natural environment¹⁶, and brought the Dayak to poverty¹⁷. In his quoted words,

“Land, forests, and rivers are nature’s three most important elements that make it possible for us to be Dayak. Forming the basis of our biological and spiritual life, determining the virtue and value of our people, these elements have nurtured the evolution of our identity, culture, and belief system over thousands of years. Without our land, forests, and rivers, our culture would die, for our traditional ceremonies, rituals, and beliefs are all embedded in nature. The disintegration of our cultural life begins with the refusal to recognize the cultural

14 John Bamba is a son of a Dayak Jelai farmer from Tanjung village, Ketapang, West Kalimantan. He graduated from Faculty of Teaching and Education, University of Tanjungpura, Pontianak. He taught junior and senior high school students at Asisi Pontianak before he joined the Institute of Dayakology, which previously was known as the Institute of Dayakology Research and Development or IDR D (see John Bamba’s biodata in Atok, et al., 1998, 114).

15 A 1998 JICA study has indicated the unsuitability of planting oil palm in Kalimantan which, according to that study, only 15 % of the area is suitable (World Rainforest Movement, 1998)

16 John Bamba argued that “if the people’s way of burning the land for shifting cultivation was wrong, Kalimantan forests would have been wiped out by the time of Indonesian Independence”. In his observation, big forest fires of 1997 happened when many big companies entered West Kalimantan at the same time (translated by author from Haryanto, 2018)

17 According to Cariño (2005), John Bamba, in his own writing ‘Seven Fortunes and Seven Calamities’, talked about “Poverty for the Dayak”, which is “linked directly with failure to exercise the Adat that governs the way in which the people should live.

functions of forests and rivers to the Dayak people, when forests are merely seen as 'green gold' which should be exploited (Szczepanski, 2002, 248; Italic in the original¹⁸)

Hence is the effort of the Dayak—through Pancur Kasih Foundation & the Institute of Dayakology—to “protect their land and their rights” by employing a combination of “participatory mapping and Geographic Information System (GIS) application” (Szczepanski, 2002, 252).

1. Transmigration Policy

With 1995 statistics using mother tongue as a proxy, we could calculate the number of Madurese population in pre-divided Sambas¹⁹, which amounted to at least 25,000 or 3.05 % of the total Sambas population²⁰ (848,200 people²¹), or 14.35 % out of 4.55% of

18 As explained by Szczepanski, these John Bamba's words were quoted from Chandra Kirana, *Beyond Gis Application: Adat Revitalization, Empowered communities and Improved Natural Resource Management Practices in West Kalimantan*, but it should be noted that this source is no longer available online.

19 Data recorded by Patebang and Sutrisno (2000) in their book *Konflik Etnis in Sambas* published by ISAI, Jakarta, having quoted it from Transmigration Department of Sambas District, indicates that in 1995 there were 2,639 households or 11,544 transmigrants from Java in Sambas, which were under the Department's supervision, and the Madurese were recorded as the largest (p. 52). Unfortunately, Patebang and Sutrisno did not write down the exact number in their report.

20 At a nominal 2.5 per cent per annum crude rate of increase, there should have been some 23,000 Madurese in 2000 in Sambas and Bengkayang districts, now there is only around 10,000 people. Obviously, the percentage of the Madurese in Sambas-Bengkayang has dropped from 3.05% in 1995 to 1.17% in 2000. In 2000, Sambas has been divided into Bengkayang and Singkawang City. The ethnic composition in **Sambas** according to the 2000 Population Census (BPS, 2001) is as follow: **Melayu Kalbar 79.64%**, Chinese 11.07%, **Dayak 4.96%**, Javanese 2.88%, Buginese-Ugi 0.39%, Sundanese 0.36% and Madurese 0.02% (although it was said that the Madurese are not allowed to enter Sambas again, and the “informal border” is set up in Selakau sub-district, the 2000 Census enumerated 75 Madurese in the new district of Sambas). Meanwhile, in the newly established District of **Bengkayang**, the ethnic composition was **Dayak 55.55%**, **Melayu Kalbar 20.21%**, Chinese 9.87%, Javanese 9.49%, Sundanese 1.38%, and Madurese 1.17% (around 10,000 people). Please notice the difference in percentage between Dayak and Malay in Sambas and Bengkayang, noted in bold, after those two districts have been separated from each other). Obviously, there are still quite a number of Madurese living in Bengkayang district post-Sanggau Ledo and Sambas conflicts.

21 As quoted by Patebang and Sutrisno (2000, p. 52).

the total West Kalimantan population²². This number is not much different from the estimate made by Sudagung (2001), based on the Local (District) Government Bureau's calculation of 1980²³. In Sudagung's estimation, the number of Madurese in Sambas District was 20,000 or 3.3% of the 601,831 Sambas population in that year (Sudagung, 2001:66). This estimation is summarised in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Number of Madurese in West Kalimantan by District and Village

Sub-district	No. of Madurese in the district (person)	Village Name	Number of Madurese in the village (person)	Percentage (in district)
Singkawang	3,538	-	-	3.1
Tebas	4,061	Kampung Rambayan	1,173	6.3
		Kp. Putting Beliuang	500	
		Kp. Segarau Parit	488	
		Kp. Segarau Sungai	900	
Sanggau Ledo	881	Kampung Merabu	400	0.8
		Kp. Jawa	195	
		Kp. Sanggau Kota	219	
		Kp. Kandangan	68	
Salamantan	4,206	Kampung Marga Mulia	1,022	19.9
		Kp. Sendoreng	625	
		Kp. Jirak	594	
		Kp. Mendung Terusan	556	
		Kp. Montrado	204	
		Kp. Sungai Petai	855	
		Kp. Kincir	350	

22 The Madurese are now spread out in Pontianak district(19.05% out of 627,293 people), Pontianak City (10.29% out of 464,534 people), Singkawang (5.33%), Ketapang (4.63%), Landak (2.16%), Bengkayang (1.17%), Sanggau (0.31%), Sintang (0.13%), and Kapuas Hulu (0.04%).

23 According to West Kalimantan Local Government Bureau (quoted by Sudagung, 2001), the number of Madurese in West Kalimantan in 1980 was estimated about 2.5 % or 62,125 people.

Sambas	500	-	-	8.0
Jawai	2,230	-	-	4.4
Pemangkat	1,656	-	-	2.3
Sungai Raya	1,500	-	-	4.0
Selakau	1,428	-	-	5.0
Total	20,000			

Source: Sudagung (2001:69–78)

In relation to the presumed problem caused by the transmigration policy, perhaps we could discuss the following example

As reported in Kalimantan Review (No.16, 1996, 39–40), in 1996, 120 Dayak Bekati²⁴ households in Dusun Paum, Kumba Village, Seluas Sub-district (at pre-division Sambas District)²⁵ made a protest because the transmigration program – please note, not a particular (ethnic) group of transmigrants - has taken 5.400 km² of their traditional land without asking permission. Moreover, their 100 ha of rubber, fruit, and rice fields were taken without compensation. Instead they were offered as “inserted transmigrant”, which means that they

24 Dayak Bekati is a Dayak sub-ethnic group which inhabits Bengkayang District, together with Dayak Ba'ahe, Dayak Banyadu, Dayak Bajare and so on. *Alternate names*: Bakatiq. *Classification*: Austronesian, Malayo-Polynesian, Land Dayak. Northwestern near Sarawak border, around Sambas and Selvas (http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=IDK). The Bekatis live in the mountains, around the Teriak River. Linguistically, they belong to the Kendayan Dayaks, but they dislike being called Kendayans. The Bekati's chiefs consider themselves as having come from the region around Sambas, finally to settle around Bengkayang as they moved from place to place, practicing shifting agriculture. The Bekatis live in comparative isolation. Besides tilling dry fields, they also tap rubber. They are also known as depth hunters. The traditions of the Bekati people are still largely preserved, although the penetration of outside influences has already begun. Bekati longhouses differ from those of other Dayaks in Kalimantan. The Bekati longhouses have no pillars, but rests on the ground. It functions as a place for the holding of ceremonies, meetings, and as kind of hostel for travelers. Many Bekati people are illiterate and faithful adherents of the old ancestral beliefs. Many wooden ancestor statues are found around Bekati villages. These wooden statues are more than one meter tall and have no arms (<http://www.goarchi.com/archo/provinces/w-kalim/w-kalimtour.html#bekati>).

25 It should be noted that Seluas village was a result of re-grouping conducted by *Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa* as the implementation of SK Gubernur Kalbar No.065/1985 concerning the administrative re-grouping of villages in order to re-organize villages in West Kalimantan (Kalimantan Review, No. 16, 1996, 39).

had to submit their land before every household received 0,5 home-yard, 0,5 productive land I, and 1 ha productive land II, or total of 2 ha, although previously they together as a group controlled a larger area of traditional land. Kalimantan Review also reported that the neighboring villages, such as Dusun Sentimok, Dusun Peleng, Dusun Pareh, and Dusun Saparan, received the same fate as Dusun Paum.

Actually, it is rather difficult to accept the local people's claim of their 5,400 km² land being 'given up' for the transmigration program, when the total area of Sambas-Bengkayang is only 11,792 km². Bengkayang, which covers the Seluas Sub-district, is as large as 5,396.30 km², thus it seems implausible that the government had allocated almost 50% of a district for a transmigration program. Meanwhile, for 3,515 households that were brought to Sambas in 1996–2001 (see Table 3.2.), obviously the government would have required more than 7,000 ha or 70 km² (since each household received 2 ha), so the exact figure should fall somewhere in between, but closer to 70 km². Unfortunately, we were confronted by technical difficulties in checking the transmigration data on the area acquired for their program in 1996. Nevertheless, if we consider the total number of transmigrants since 1955 till 2001, we could see that with 114,274 households receiving about 2 ha per household, at least the local Dayak and Malay have lost out about 230,000 ha of their traditional lands. For the Sambas-Bengkayang District itself, with the arrival of 11,271 households, they lost about 22,500 ha or 225 km². Of course, it is not large if we compared it to 11,782 km² of the total area of Sambas-Bengkayang District, or even if we compared it to the areas granted by the government to companies as discussed below. However, most of those migrants are concentrated in the areas that are closer to the road, so it could not be helped if they become very conspicuous in the eyes of the locals, especially when their economic achievement has been very rapid compared to that of the Dayak and Malay.

Table 3.2. Transmigration Data to West Kalimantan until 2001 by Location and Fiscal Year (Number of Households).

	Pra-Pelita 1955-1968	Pelita I 1969- 1974	Pelita II 1974-1979	Pelita III 1982-1984	Pelita IV 1984-1986	Pelita V 1990-1994 ^{*)}	Pelita VI 1996-2001	Total
	No. of households/ population	No. of households/ population	No. of households/ population	No. of households/ population or No. of the household only	No. of households/ population or No. of the household only	No. of household	No. of household	No. of household
Pontianak	1.052/5.222	925/4.244	2.520/11.153	2.450/10.641	313/1.179	2.118	4.949	14.327
Sambas			1.250/5.135	4.673	360/1488	-	3.515 -	9.798 -
			These numbers were only for Sanggau Ledo (1978/1979) ^{**)}		Sanggau Ledo 1984/1985 110/550 1986/1987 113/397			Sanggau Ledo 1.473
Sanggau		350/1.476		4.750/20.791	2.618	11.134	6.445	25.297
Sintang				15.099/63.329	665/2.931	1.050	3.234	20.048
Kapuas Hulu				1.346/5.657	-	759	1.030	3.135
Ketapang				5.799	10.879	7.308	17.683	41.669
TOTAL	1.052/5.222	925/4.244	4.120/17.764	34.117	14.835	22.369	36.856	114.274

Source: Data acquired by Andri W. P. from the West Kalimantan Transmigration Department.

^{*)} The data provided by Kalimantan Review (No.19, 1996, 9), saying that the general transmigration in West Kalimantan in 1991 brought 1,691 households (7,343 people), in 1991 there were 2,492 households (11,874 people), and in 1993 there were 721 households (2,661 people). Therefore, in those three years, we had a total of 4,904 households or 21,878 people brought in, which was almost similar to the above total figure for that period.

^{**)} Based on the data provided by West Kalimantan Transmigration Regional Office of December 1981, Sudagung (2001, p. 61) recorded 843 households or 3,605 transmigrants that were sent to Sanggau Ledo in 1978/1979.

The largest transmigrant group is in Ketapang, which totaled 41.669 households. In Sambas area amounted to only 9.798 households, with 1.473 of them to Sanggau Ledo, the location of 1996/97 conflict. Unfortunately, we could not find any data to indicate the ethnicity or even the place of origin of the transmigrants mentioned above, except for what was quoted by Kalimantan Review (No. 19, 1996, 9) in accordance with BPS Provinsi Kalimantan Barat (1994), which showed that the number of transmigrants by place of origin and place of destination in that year is as follows:

Table 3.3. Number of Migrants to West Kalimantan by Place of Origin and Place of Destination

Place of Origin	Place of Destination/District (Household/People)						Total (Household/ People)
	Sambas	PTK	Sanggau	Ketapang	Sintang	KPH	
Jakarta	-	-	50/187	146/470	-	-	196/657
West Java	17/76	104/372	272/1045	499/1939	212/811	-	1104/4243
Central Java	-	50/186	198/688	467/1619	142/489	-	857/2982
Yogyakarta	-	-	166/589	171/585	-	-	337/1174
East Java(poss. incl Madurese)	-	40/148	154/507	573/2004	150/499	-	917/3158
West Kalimantan	59/354	30/176	909/4322	551/2545	296/1510	-	1845/8907
NTB	-	-	51/235	223/897	52/164	-	326/1296
NTT	-	-	63/238	91/442	98/356	-	252/1036
Total	76/430	224/882	1873/7811	2721/10.500	950/3829	-	5,844/23.453

Source: Kalimantan Review (No. 19, 1996, 10); BPS Provinsi Kalimantan Barat (1994)

In 1994, only 76 households or 430 people came to Sambas as transmigrants, and it seems that they are not Javanese or Madurese, because they came from West Java and West Kalimantan. Based on this little information, we should accept that the Madurese—as

generally said—are “spontaneous migrants” at least for the Sambas District. Therefore, perhaps we could tentatively conclude that it is not “organized transmigration,” but rather “spontaneous migration” that is the cause of the violence in West Kalimantan.

2. The Exploitation of Natural Resources

If we now turn to the issue of natural resource exploitation (through logging activities since 1969 and later oil palms concessions²⁶) during New Order period which has created the economic dispossession of indigenous communities, and at the same time changed the local people’s economic subsistent lifestyles into a dependency on the wage-labour economy, or to the fact that logging and oil palms concessions have encroached on traditional lands of Dayaks and other indigenous groups and become a source of contention, the following example would certainly provide us a Figure of how development policies has directly or indirectly “marginalized” the local people. Though not explicitly racial or ethnocentric in character, the development policies may have created horizontal inequalities with implications affecting certain ethnic groups.

Oil palm arrived in West Kalimantan in 1974 under Governor Kadarusno with the opening of 14,000 ha PNP (state-sponsored company) VII in Ngabang, followed by PIR-SUS Parindu, PIR-Trans Kembayan, PIR-Trans PT MPE, and PIR-Trans PT KSP all in Sanggau District in 1982 (11,500 ha, 7,500 ha, 11,000 ha, and 15,000 ha consecutively), as well as by PIR-Trans MISP I & II in Sambas District (20,000 ha). By the end of 1993, the total area of palm oil plantation in West Kalimantan had amounted to 135,903 ha or about 0,9% of the province’s total area.

26 Including the question: how the racialized recruitment of the logging companies as well as coal and mining industries has contributed to the marginalization of the Dayaks and the Malays?


Table 3.4. The Area of the Palm Oil Plantation in West Kalimantan

Year	Planted Areal/ ha	Concession Granted	Allocated area
1993	135.903	1.558.000	5,2 million ha or about 25 % of the total area of West Kalimantan (14.680.700 ha)
1996	204.218		
1999	223.351		
2000	330.317	3.560.251	

Source: "Statistik Kehutanan & Perkebunan 1997/1998" as in Kalimantan Review (No. 74, 2001, 12–13); and Bappeda Kalbar (2000, as quoted by Ranik, 2004, p. 42).


The largest concession area in the year 2000 was at Ketapang (795,555 ha, 39 companies), Pontianak/Landak (724,789 ha, 49 companies), and Sanggau (723,700 ha, 37 companies). Meanwhile at Sambas/Bengkayang—where the conflicts are much more disturbing—the total area of oil palms concessions was 428, 572 ha (35 companies) or about 8% of the total area of palm oil plantation in West Kalimantan, or about 2.9% of the total area of Sambas (1,229,600 ha), and it was the second smallest concession area after Kapuas Hulu (320,160 ha, 22 companies). Nevertheless, not all those companies are in operation, only 84 companies over the area of 330,316.64 ha or 6.35% of the allocated total. In Sambas/Bengkayang, for example, only 10 companies operate in 35,109.53 ha or 0.003% of the total area of Sambas. In 2001, the number of companies grew to 25. In Pontianak/Landak, there were 19 companies operating in the area of 29,871.89 ha, and in Ketapang there were 13 companies with 84,523 ha of total area. The productive land is even less: in Sambas/Bengkayang only 25,872 ha, in Pontianak/Landak only 15,461.81 ha, and in Ketapang only 67,695 ha. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show graphical charts of the number of farmers and the number of production in tonnage for each commercial crop in Sanggau Ledo District between 1995 and 1996. For oil palm, we could see that fewer than

500 farmers were working in that sector in 1996, with production of about 800 tons only. Most farmers in the area worked in rubber (about 2,000 workers), which produced around 1,300–1,600 tons in 1995/1996, and in hybrid coconut plantations. So far, the production of hybrid coconut has been quite small, less than 200 tons, although the number of farmers working in this sector in 1995/1996 was quite large, more than 2,500 people. Obviously, with such low productivity, the farmers could not actually support themselves—needless to say—during the 1996 crisis.



Source: Acquired by Andri W. P. from the local authority.

Figure 3.1. Number of Farmers in Sanggau Ledo Sub-district by Type of Plantation



Source: Acquired by Andri W. P. from the local authority.

Figure 3.2. Number of Production in Sanggau Ledo Sub-district

In most cases, the first problem raised is that of the concessions, rather than the operation of the companies. Based on conflicts reported in the media, we could name PT Mitra Inti Sejahtera Plantation (MISP), as well as PT Rana Wastu Kencana (RWK), as two of the five biggest oil palm companies in Sambas²⁷. PT MISP is located in Sempurna Village at Subah Sub-district; but in 1992, it had extended its area to Sepantai at Sejangkung Sub-district, which according to the report, was without any written agreement with the local people. Conflict occurred when seeing company allocated shares of land to plant to transmigrants in 2001 (please note that the ethnic origin of the transmigrants was not mentioned), the local people also demanded their shares of land. Conflict occurred again in

²⁷ Another source lists five oil palm companies that are operating in Sambas District, namely PT Bantaman Eka Jaya (located in Sejangkung, Sambas and Seluas Sub-districts with area of TM 3,052 ha and TBM 800 ha), PT Karya Bogakusuma (at Tebas Sub-district, with area of TM 40 ha), PT Karya Bogamitra (at Sambas, with area of TM 694 ha), PT RWK (at Tebas and Sambas Sub-districts, with area of TM 250 ha and TBM 2,974 ha), and PT Mitra Inti Sejahtera (at Sambas and Sejangkung sub-districts, with area of TM 3,157 ha and TBM 1,581 ha) (Kalimantan Review, No. 101, 2004, 8).

2004, but the location is not clear. The only information mentioned is about Dayak Bekati. The media also mentioned several previous conflicts with local people at Sepandak Kampung Village in the same sub-district of Subah and with Momong Village at Sanggau Ledo Sub-district. Unfortunately, no elaboration was made. Meanwhile, a conflict in 2001 between local people and PT RWK occurred in Nyayat and Baribas Villages in the Tebas Sub-district for the same reason²⁸. They said, “We never knew if the company wanted to visit our village. Never any company representative coming to meet us to explain about their plan to take over our land. We have never given our approval to submit our land. The one who made such an agreement was only the head of the village, the deceased Pak Nyangkot” (Ranik, 2004, p. 3). Even though transmigrants were mentioned ‘in passing’, but it is obvious that transmigrants could become one of the sources of conflict because of their receiving shares of land that were previously only locally owned, and thus triggered local people’s protest and anger against related companies. Ranik herself admitted the benefit of oil palms as a profitable export commodity, but she also listed several losses suffered by the Dayaks:

- a) It destroys Dayak culture of shifting agriculture, which is full of ritual-s and religious beliefs, b) It is economically unbeneficial because it destroys other Dayak sources of incomes, such as rubber, fruits, firewoods, and hunted animals, c) The Dayak lost their lands: they give up 7 ha to obtain 2 ha plantation area, 0,75 ha food crop area, and 0,25 ha for house (5x6 metres) and front or back yard, 4) It changed the Dayak into a debtor to the bank and/or company, whose debts have to be paid by cutting down 30% of what he receives from selling the oil palms to the

28 For details, see Ranik (2004). However, it should be mentioned here that Ranik talked about Meribas instead of Baribas village. The name Baribas was obtained from Andri W. P.’s interview.

company, 5) The large-scale plantation of oil palms has destroyed ecosystem and natural environment, particularly the fertility of land (pp. 45–48).

Since her book was written for the purpose of empowering the community, which in her opinion, is under the oppression of companies, including oil palm companies, obviously her underlying assumption is that the oil palm companies brought no benefit to the people, which in this case is referred to the Dayak as the locals. Ranik did not list transmigrants and their relations to the losses suffered by the Dayaks, and this is perhaps because she, not like Mering Ngo, sees companies as the ‘main culprit’ in the marginalization of the Dayak.

From the description above, it is difficult to say what the connection between these land conflicts with the 1997/99 conflict is. Although, Sejangkung and Tebas Sub-districts, as well as Sanggau Ledo, are recorded as part of the conflict area in 1997/1999. According to some people interviewed, Sanggau Ledo Sub-district, as well as part of Seluas Sub-district (like Samalantan, Monterado), is the main political base of the Javanese transmigrants, not the Madurese. Meanwhile, before conflict, the Madurese was known to concentrate at Jirak Village in Samalantan Sub-district. Jirak Village was mentioned on earlier conflict, not on the 1997/1999 violent clash. The Madurese living in the area mostly worked as farmer, and some of them even had rubber plants. When pursued further, some Madurese respondents were able to make a list of wealthy Madurese in the area who were locally conspicuously rich. These people owned a very important business that has a relatively large public impact, such as transportation and construction. We should admit that, due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate statistical data, our explanation of Sanggau Ledo conflict is rather vague, but by further investigating the socioeconomic context of Sambas conflict, perhaps we could provide a clearer Figure about economic factor as the cause of conflict in that area.

3. *Jeruk* Story

Sambas was once known as the center of *jeruk*²⁹. Out of the 28,000 tonne produced by West Kalimantan in 1996/1997, 96% or 27,000 tonne was from Sambas (see SMERU report written by Hudaya, 1999). In early 1990s, it was estimated to cover 20,000 ha (about 2% of total Sambas area), and engaging some 25,000 persons (about 10% of those working in “horticulture”). However, by mid-1990s, there was a collapse on *jeruk* trade due to *Tata Niaga* marketing scheme, leading to abandonment & disease attack. The explanation for the collapse was as follow: technically part of the fruit should be cut to keep the tree healthy, but since the price of *jeruk* was very high, the farmer “forced” his trees to produce as much as possible, destroying

29 Sambas was also known, and is still known as “*lumbung padi*” or paddy producer, number two in West Kalimantan after the Pontianak district. In the year 2000, it produced 217,319 tonnes of paddy from an area of 74,277 ha. Since the road from Pontianak to Sambas is in a very bad condition, the trip will usually take around 5-6 hours while it is only 97 km from Sambas to its northern border with Malaysia. Therefore, the Sambas people at the border area prefer to sell their products to Malaysia rather than to Pontianak. Moreover, the price in Malaysia is higher.

Sambas economy, with the area of 6,395.7 km² and total population of 452,046 people (Census 2000), depends on several main agricultural products, and three with the biggest area for development are rubber (327,010 ha), coconut (125,301 ha) and oil palm (28,679 ha). According to Fishery Department of Sambas District, in 2002 the planted areas for each commodity are only 49,253 ha, 22,485 ha, and 9,536 ha, respectively (see Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003, pp. 396). The second largest contribution to GRDP of Sambas comes from trade, hotel, and restaurant, that is 191,626.05 million rupiah in 1999. It was a temporary figure that was calculated based on Constant Price of 1993, compared to agriculture with 216,825.23 million rupiah in the same year. The sub-district with the highest contribution in agriculture in 1999 was Tebas (80,223.79 million rupiah), followed by Pemangkat (53,537.14 million rupiah, while in trading sector, Pemangkat was the highest contributor (42,053.39 million rupiah), followed by Tebas and Sambas with 33,477.53 and 32,601.12 million rupiah, respectively.

The only place in Sambas District which has a very low contribution to GRDP in every sector is Sajingan Besar at the further end of coastal area, which is closer to Malaysia. Its total GRDP in 1999 was 3,463.19 million rupiah. The local government's future plan is to build and develop the area of Sajingan Besar, which is inhabited by Dayak Bekati, into “Otorita Sajingan”, modelling on the “Otorita Batam”. Since Sajingan—which is located in Paloh district—is only 4 km from Biawak, Sarawak, they believe that opening industrial area in that place will help developing Sambas district as whole and the Sajingan area in particular (which includes Sebunga village, Aruk, Aping and Beruang). At the moment there are already a lot of smuggling activities in the area. They smuggle pepper, rubber and logs to Malaysia. Some people argue that if one of the reasons for the development of the area is to control smuggling activities, why not just open an official border?

their sustainability level. Then, when the price was low, the farmer had left the fruit rotten on the tree, and thus brought disease attacks on the trees. At the end the whole commodity inevitably perished. As a result, we could see an exodus of estimated 30,000 persons, mainly to Sarawak. Later, during the Financial Crisis of 1997, there was an expulsion of undocumented workers from Sarawak, who had to return to Sambas but could not find a job. Some observers claimed that these people were those who formed the personnel for the riots. Is there an evidence for Jeruk Story?


According to the profile of Sambas District published by Tim Litbang Kompas (2003, pp. 395–402), it is true that the economic activity of Sambas has once time become “unconscious” (to use their term), when the production of *jeruk siam* (known as *jeruk pontianak*) was destroyed in 1995, which, according to many people, was due to the *Tata Niaga Jeruk* introduced from 1988 to 1998 by New Order government (it was said to closely related to Tommy Soeharto’s business interests). In that period, at least six times, the Governor of West Kalimantan published a decree to arrange the selling and the buying of *jeruk*, ranging from establishing the basic price up to setting up an “organized” market mechanism through a joint-cooperation project between companies and cooperatives as directly appointed by the Governor (see the aforementioned SMERU report). The famous one was that of Humpus (Tommy Soeharto) with cooperation with Puskud, whose operation was legalized by Governor’s Decree No. 088/1988 and No. 88A/1988. Due to the lack of profit and heavy criticism they received from the people, after two years in operation, they resigned and the commodity was placed under the coordination of APJKB (Jeruk Traders Association of West Kalimantan) which was later replaced by ASPjer (Jeruk Siam Traders Association of Jakarta). In 1991, the Governor appointed PT Bima Citra Mandiri (BCM, a Bambang Soeharto’s company) as the new coordinator for *jeruk* trade by enacting a new decree, No. 296/1991. However, just

like Humpus, they received many complaints and criticisms, so they could not last long. The Governor—with Decree No. 555/1993—had to return it to Puskud, which partnered PT Raja Sri Sejahtera (RSS). After being implemented for five years, finally the government put a stop to the “organized” mechanism by replacing the previous decree for Puskud with Decree No. 21/1998 issued on 29 January 1998. However, at that time, the remaining area of *jeruk* was no more than 1,500 ha. With the arrangement, the farmer could not take care of their *jeruk* because they only received the payment after the harvesting, unlike previously, when at any time they could borrow money from traders for fertilizers, insecticides as well as for their daily life. This is the reason Sambas lost more than 90% of its *jeruk* production within those five years.

At one time, from 1986 to 1992, *jeruk* production of Sambas achieved 234,509 tonnes per year (with a productive area of 14,756 ha and a planting area of 21,377 ha). However, with the price falling to the lowest level, about Rp1,500 per kilogram (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:401), the farmer could no longer take care of their *jeruk*, and eventually various plant diseases attacked the *jeruk* plantation on a significant scale. Therefore, *jeruk* production continued to sink to only 4 ha in 2000 (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:397; another source said about 40 ha). About 22,000 *jeruk* farmers lost their income, not including those who worked for them and in the related sector (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:397)

However, if we follow the results of the SMERU study, the *jeruk* trade shows a different trend. The production started to grow since 1986 and reach its peak during 1992/1993. Afterwards it consistently decreased, especially since 1996 it dropping drastically, around 4,000 ha a year and even reaching a 10,000 ha decrease in 1997. On the other hand, the price continued to increase, from around Rp. 396/kg for type D and Rp. 563/kg for type C in 1991 to Rp. 1.654/kg/type D

and Rp. 2.798/kg/type C in 1998, and then to Rp. 2.548/kg for type C and Rp. 4.371/kg for type D during fieldwork.



Source: Hudaya (1999)

Figure 3.3. The Growth of Jeruk’s Production Area and Prices

If we compared the graphs from SMERU in Figure 3.3 with data presented by Bupati Sambas³⁰ in Table 3.5, we could see a very significant difference. Those presented by Bupati Sambas showed a

30 Paper presentation during “National Workshop on Jeruk Development and Exhibition” in Bogor, 10–11 July 2002, later published as a proceeding titled *Agribisnis Jeruk Saat Ini dan Strategi Pengembangan ke Depan* (Direktorat Jenderal Bina Produksi Holtikultura Kalimantan Barat, n.d)

dramatic decrease during the period between 1992 and 2000, not only in hectare, but also in tonne.

Table 3.5. Planted and Harvested Areas and Production of Jeruk

Year	Planted Area (ha)	Harvested area (ha)	Production in tonne
1981	2.700	1.200	21.216
1992	21.377	14.756	234.509
1996	15.576	11.918	83.566
1998	3.906	1.132	6.792
2000	545	4	Ta
2001 ^{*)}	2.191	271	Ta
2001*)	2.587	pm	Pm

Note: *) until April 2002

Source: Direktorat Jenderal Bina Produksi Holtikultura Kalimantan Barat (n.d.)

The people of Tebas themselves—Tebas is the center of *jeruk* at Sambas District when interviewed—talked about the hardship they experienced during that period. According to them, slowly the price of *jeruk* fell to the lowest level, and according to those interviewed, the price actually went down to Rp500 and Rp100 per kilogram, cheaper than the price of box they used to put the *jeruk*. That is why they let their *jeruk* rotten on the tree and, as a consequence, destroying

^{*)} From the Table 3.5 above, we could also see how several farmers tried to revive their jeruk production in year 2001, but obviously with no result, so they discontinued it until the local government set up as one of its missions to rebuild “Sambas as the production center for Jeruk” by signing a joint-cooperation with several private companies. One of them is PT Multi Jeruk Lestari. PT Multi Jeruk Lestari tried to re-developed Jeruk plantation in the same year with PIR pattern on the areal of 6,000 ha which will be divided into 3,000 ha “core” areal and 3,000 ha “plasma” land, and at the moment about 600 ha has been planted. Similarly the people in five sub-districts of Sambas (of total 12 sub-districts) have started to re-plant the jeruk with the aid of local government, so till April 2002, about 2,587 ha has been planted. Statistics from Dinas Perikanan Sambas District 2002 (as acquired by Andri W.P.) also shows that the areal allocated for fruit is 25,624 ha, but only 4,529 ha or 17,67 % was productive.

the whole *jeruk* production in the area. After *jeruk* production was destroyed, according to the local government's report (as collected by Andri W.P.), the people's economic condition became very bad that they no longer could buy car or go to Mekkah for Muslim pilgrimage like they used to. They even could not afford to send their children to school, and in order to survive, many of them had to sell their household goods. Thus, many of the Sambas people went to Malaysia (Sarawak) and worked as TKI. From the information given to Kompas by Bupati Sambas Burhanuddin A. Rasyid, there are 30,000 people from Sambas that are working in Malaysia legally (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003, p. 401). If there are also others who worked illegally, the number of those working in Malaysia would certainly be bigger than the aforementioned number.

Even though we could not calculate the ratio between the Madurese and the Dayak workers, but we could refer to data from the Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (Susenas) 1996 (BPS, 2012) that indicates there was indeed a problem in the agricultural sector. The Susenas 1996 shows a decrease in the number & percentage of workers aged 14–64 in agriculture, although it is more obvious at the provincial level rather than at the (Sambas) district level. The number has decreased around 15 thousand in 1996 for West Kalimantan, while there was only a decrease of about five hundred for Sambas District. Similarly, we could see a decrease of about 2,500 workers in the industrial sector of Sambas (**Table 3.6 & 3.7** below). Perhaps we could then assume that during that period, due to the *jeruk* destruction, there was a significant movement of Sambas workers from agricultural and industrial sectors to other types of jobs.

Table 3.6. Numbers & Percentage of Workers Aged 15-64 Years Old by Sector in West Kalimantan Province & Sambas District (1993-1996)

	West Kalimantan						Sambas					
Sectors	1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996
	No of workers	%	No of workers	%	No of workers	%	No of workers	%	No of workers	%	No of workers	%
Agricult	879338	69	877351	66	885248	65	870168	64	226215	75	228112	70
Mining	21664	2	32333	2	27079	2	27241	2	2168	1	2216	1
Industry	71884	6	70024	5	78268	6	71897	5	15665	5	16376	4
Electricity	5558	0	3914	0	3513	0	4546	0	506	0	872	0
Construct	34217	3	35279	3	46813	3	47792	4	5295	2	8992	2
Trade	90712	7	115656	9	122324	9	130863	10	22156	7	29200	10
Transport												
Communic	25467	2	25924	2	35394	3	38336	3	5096	2	4088	3
Finance	4483	0	5885	0	4309	0	8747	1	470	0	600	0
Services	138718	11	144682	11	159086	12	164415	12	25281	8	33656	9
Others	2832	0	11736	1	1718	0	539	0	271	0	672	0
Total	1274873	100	1322784	100	1363752	100	1364544	100	303123	100	324784	100

Source: BPS (2012)


A decrease in agricultural workers at the provincial level is also seen in the workers' composition by sector. The percentage of agriculture workers in 1996 decreased (64) compared to 1993 (69). Although the number of agriculture workers in the Sambas District has not decreased much, but the percentage of those who worked in agriculture has also decreased from 75 in 1993 into 70 in 1996. People in West Kalimantan province, as well as in the Sambas District, seem to choose construction and services as their alternative occupation in 1995, and trade & transportation-communication in 1996, as shown by the significant increases in those related occupations during that period of time (**Table 3.7**).

Table 3.7. The Fluctuation of Workers Aged 15–64 Years Old by Sector in West Kalimantan Province & Sambas District (1993–1996)

Sectors	West Kalimantan			Sambas		
	1994-1993	1995-1994	1996-1995	1994-1993	1995-1994	1996-1995
Agriculture	-1987	7897	-15080	4021	-2124	-490
Mining	10669	-5254	162	4122	-4074	256
Industry	-1860	8244	-6371	-4737	5448	-2526
Electricity	-1644	-401	1033	-202	568	308
Construction	1062	11534	979	223	3474	-1800
Trade	24944	6668	8539	13254	-6210	3334
Transportation-Communication	457	9470	2942	-544	-464	4874
Finance	1402	-1576	4438	512	-382	552
Services	5964	14404	5329	4127	4248	-5365
Others	8904	-10018	-1179	641	-240	
Total	47911	40968	792	21417	244	-1529

Source: BPS (2012)

From the graphical sketch in Figure 3.4, we could certainly conclude that the economic and employment structure in Sambas's agricultural sector has experienced a significant downturn during the period of 1993–1997, that obviously has a certain financial impact on the people.



Source: acquired by Andri W.P. from the local authority

Figure 3.4 The Distribution of Percentage in Economic and Employment (Labour Structure of Agriculture in Sambas District

Our investigation on the Tebas area has discover a quite significant level of frustration that was build up before the violent conflict broke out. The main reason for such a high level of frustration was the worsening of the *jeruk* and logging based economy which was once the main source of income for the majority of the people in this area. The situation became worse during the 1997 crisis that rocked the country since. As we know, many TKIs (*tenaga kerja Indonesia*, or immigrant workers), particularly the illegal ones, were forced to return home. At the same time, those who work for logging company in Riau also have to stop their trips there due to less employment.

The story reported by Flavia et al. (2004) about the Malay community in Twi Mentibar Village at Selakau Sub-district, Sambas District, before the Sambas conflict of 1999 tells us a similar condition

When the commodity of oranges were abundant in the mid-1990s, there was an increase in the inhabitants' economic status. Houses were built better than ever, satellite dishes, motorized vehicles and even cars could be seen in the inhabitants' houses. However, when orange plantations failed in the mid-1990s, the economic status of Mentibar community, especially the Malay, decreased drastically. As a result, young people sought for employment in Malaysia. Initially, they managed to invigorate their families' economic status. However, when the monetary crisis began to hit Indonesia and Malaysia in mid-1997, many Indonesian workers were sent back to their respective hometown including those coming from Twi Mentibar. This worsened the families' economic burden. The failure of orange commodity, monetary crisis, return of workers from Malaysia caused the destruction of Twi Mentibar community's economic life... (pp. 33–34).

B. Malay-Madurese Competition in Sambas?

Did the worsening of the Sambas' economic situation really have any bearing on the 1999 conflict? Did it cause the people great hardship so that so much tension built up, and all it took was a little spark to get people going, especially against an 'enemy' they thought they could easily defeat? Or was it that the Madurese were working for the companies, hence were the 'front line' as far as the Dayak were concerned? Or were people who had taken potential jobs away from them? Is Andri W.P. right in suggesting that the conflict between the Malay and the Madurese started in the informal sector when

the Malay who worked in Malaysia returned to Sambas during the economic crisis of 1997³¹?

According to some Madurese informants, at Tebas, where the violence started, the number of Madurese was quite large (but we had some difficulty in finding the exact number), and besides ordinary Madurese who work in various jobs, there are a number of noticeably rich Madurese running transportation businesses, big shops, as well as providing loan money. In Twi Mentibar, Selakau, according to Flavia et al. (2004, p. 34), the Madurese work as beef and fish vendors, selling and buying cows, and as road builders. Clearly, the Madurese controlled most of the possible job employment in the area. Therefore, it is unavoidable for the returned Malay TKIs, because of the 'large-scale unemployment' from Malaysia, to have a tight competition with the Madurese back home.

A similar situation might confront the recent jobless Riau loggers. Perhaps the situation has considerably increased their frustration over the previous destruction of jeruk business. Thus, it is not surprising that, not long afterwards, the 1999 bloody conflict broke out. As a result, the Sambas economy for the few years afterward was practically *mati suri* (meaning "on the edge of dead", again to use Kompas' term). In this case, perhaps it is still possible to conclude that 'horizontal inequalities' were underlying the clash between the Malays and the Madurese, but not as the main reason for the clash to occur between those two groups. This would be a 'social-psychological argument' proposed by some observers that, when frustrations build up, the people (the Malays) hit out at the nearest target, which in this instance was the Madurese.

From the description above, there is still no strong evidence that there was/is direct competition between Madurese and

31 This argument from Andri W. P. was taken from his unpublished paper titled "Transformasi Kekerasan Struktural-Negara Pada Kekerasan Etnik: Kasus-kasus Eskalasi Konflik Etnik di Kalimantan Barat."

Dayak/Malay over natural resources, specifically forest resources. Unfortunately, due to various technical problems, we also failed to obtain employment statistics in timber and plantation industries as well as in the lower end occupations and informal sector, to support or reject the assumptions of direct or indirect economic competition, a contest in which “indigenes” lost out to the “migrants.” Instead, we found the case of “indigenes’ losing out to migrants” in the Dayak’s experience in Politics and in Local Government, as published in Kalimantan Review (No. 43, 1999, 33). However, as explained above, the Madurese are generally in the lower strata with poor educational attainment, and their relative numbers rule out any serious competition for political position without support or patronage from other groups, especially local Dayaks and Malays. Therefore, in politics, we could say that the Dayak would not actually lose out to the Madurese, but to the Javanese. And our findings are certainly not related to the Malay’s experience vis-à-vis Madurese migrants. We do not know whether there was a political competition between the Malays and the Madurese. Still, according to Flavia, et al. (2004, p. 33), as a Malay at Twi Mentibar admitted, once there was a political collaboration between the Madurese and the Malay, that is when, in 1995, Johansyah was elected as Twi Mentibar Village’s chief, replacing Safari Ibrahim. He was supported by the Madurese at Pondok Batu.

Chapter IV

Ethnicity Issues in West Kalimantan's Local Politics

A. Dayak in Politics 1955–1997

If we calculate the number of Dayaks in politics—which include those in regional house of representatives (DPRD) and political parties (Parpol)—as well as local government (see Table 4.1), we could see that although their number in politics was decreasing from 1955 to 1971, since 1977 it has re-increased until it reached a stable number in the 1987 and 1992 elections (14 people). Only in the last election during Soeharto's New Order, the 1997 election, that the number of Dayak decreased dramatically to only three people. Meanwhile, the number of Dayak in governor's office has been up and down following the appointment of Javanese as West Kalimantan Governors in 1959, 1965, 1971, and 1977, as well as the appointment of a non-West Kalimantan Malay Governor in 1987 and 1997.

Table 4.1. Dayak in Politics (DPRD and Parpol) and Local Government

Dayak in Politics (DPRD and Parpol)		Dayak in Local Government
DPRD Kalbar from the 1955 Election	12 Dayak (<i>Partai Daya</i>)	1 st Dayak Governor 4 Dayak <i>Bupati</i>
1959 Election	9 Dayak (6 <i>Parkindo</i> , two religious representatives, and 1 Dayak representative)	2 Dayak in the Governor's office (Javanese Governor)
1965 Election	7 Dayak (3 <i>IPKI</i> , 1 <i>PNI</i> , 2 <i>Partai Katolik</i> , and 1 <i>Golkar</i>)	1 Dayak in the Governor's office (Javanese Governor)
1971 Election (10 parties)	5 Dayak (2 <i>Partai Katolik</i> , 2 <i>Golkar</i> and 1 <i>ABRI</i>)	1 st period 1 Dayak and 2 nd period 3 Dayak in the Governor's office (Javanese Governor)
1977 Election	10 Dayak out of 40 (25%) (2 <i>PDI</i> , 7 <i>Golkar</i> , 1 <i>ABRI</i>)	2 Dayak in the Governor's office (Javanese Governor)
1987 Election	14 Dayak out of 45 (4 <i>PDI</i> , 8 <i>Golkar</i> , 2 <i>ABRI</i>)	1 st period 2 Dayak and 2 nd period (since 1994), no Dayak in the Governor's office
1992 Election	14 Dayak out of 45 (5 <i>PDI</i> , 8 <i>Golkar</i> , 2 <i>ABRI</i>) + 2 Dayak in DPR/MPR-Jakarta	4 Dayak <i>Camat</i> in Sambas district (out of 17) 5 Dayak <i>Camat</i> + 2 Dayak in Pontianak District office (out of 19)
1997 Election	3 Dayak (<i>PDI</i>) + 2 Dayak in DPR/MPR-Jakarta	4 Dayak <i>Camat</i> and 2 Dayak in Sanggau district office (out of 20) 3 Dayak <i>Camat</i> and 4 Dayak in the Singtang district office (out of 18) 3 Dayak <i>Camat</i> and 4 Dayak in Kapuas Hulu district office (out of 16) 2 Dayak <i>Camat</i> and 4 Dayak in the Ketapang district office (out of 14) (Malay Governor from outside Kalbar)

Source: various reports in Kalimantan Review after the 1998 Reformasi.

As a total, the number of Dayak at the local government's offices has been increasing over the years. Still, their position has become lower since 1987, as there were more Dayak at the sub-district level rather than in the district and provincial levels, i.e. 21 *camat* out of the total 104 for the whole province before the split-up or *pemekaran* (namely Sambas with Bengkayang, Pontianak with Landak, Sanggau with Sekadau, and Sintang with Melawi).

B. Political Changes Between 1997-1999

The most obvious thing that happened after the 1996/97 Sanggau Ledo conflict is that the Dayak in West Kalimantan have started to gain a more widespread recognition of their existence in West Kalimantan. However, others will say that the non-Dayak defer out of fear. Whatever it is, the changing situation has enabled the Dayak to ask the non-Dayak to recognize their customary law. For example, along the main road that goes through the Dayak territory, the Dayak are openly applying their customary law to whoever causes them any losses. The number of cases dealt with customary law is growing daily, and customary law even applies to groups or institutions. When vehicles run down their domestic or farm animals (such as pigs, dogs, etc), for example, the Dayak will demand some compensation, which according to them, is the necessary part of their customary law. Similarly, when young people of non-Dayak origin were involved in a fight with a Dayak youngster in Pontianak, they would also be sentenced according to the Dayak customary law. However, could we call it *adat* if a non-Dayak was being punished when he got into a fight with a Dayak, although there was no proof that the non-Dayak unwarrantedly started the fight?

The action was not responded positively by the Malays. At one time, there was a case of Malay-Dayak tension in 2000 because a Malay from Tanjung Harapan Alley in Pontianak was charged

according to the Dayak Customary Law. The 1999 conflict between the Sambas Malays and the Madurese might be a way to prove that the Malays could do the same, even though it perhaps could be considered as “a letdown” if, in 2000, a Malay could still be charged according to the Dayak law.

As a counteract, the Malays formed Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu (Malay Custom and Cultural Council) in almost every district in West Kalimantan to revitalize the Malay cultural symbols, including the reconstruction of Malay customary house, as to be compared to the Dayak Betang House in Pontianak. They also re-established the Malay traditional social-political structure like the Dayaks have done. The heir of the Malay kingdom was re-crowned with the re-installment of the *panglima* position and status in almost every territory of the Malay kingdom. At one time, the Malays even considered “making Malay Customary Law,” but of course the basic principles would be drawn from Islam, and we could imagine what will happen if the Malay continues with that action; it might cause Islam-Christian conflict. Some people see all these as only a ‘symbolic’ action that has no impact because the situation had not changed the Dayak insistence to develop ethnic solidarity and symbols in the political life of West Kalimantan.

As it happened, both sides continue to relay their group’s messages to the public. A clearer message was sent by Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu or FKPM (Communication Forum for Malays Youngsters), which was initiated by Malay students in Pontianak but later was formally established by Sambas Malays in Singkawang (when it was still the capital city of Sambas District). FKPM—led by the heir of the Sambas Malay kingdom, “Wimpi” Winata Kusumah—became a widely recognized paramilitary group that severely protected the Malay groups’ interests. For example, they rejected the possibility that a non-Malay, hence a Chinese, could become the Mayor of Singkawang. Its leader, the heir of Sambas

Kingdom, tried to run for the Head of Sambas District in the 2006 Direct Election. Unfortunately, he just required second position under the present (& previous) District Head, Burhanuddin A. Rasjid, who, according some informants, has used his bureaucratic power to win election. The result of the 2006 Direct Election of Sambas District can be seen in Table 4.2. below.

Table 4.2. Names of Sambas District Head and Vice Head Candidates

No.	Names of Candidates for Head and Vice Head of Sambas District	Supporting Parties	Number of Votes Obtained
1.	Ir. H. Burhanuddin A. Rasyid & Dr. Hj. Juliarti Djuhardi Alwi, MPH	PPP/PBR/PAN/PD/PBB	162,852 votes
2.	Ir. H. Prabasa Anantatur & Rd. "Wempi" Winata Kesuma (Leader of FKPM)	Partai Golkar	46,491 votes
3.	Uray Barudin Idris & Zulfydar Zaidar Mochtar, SE, MM	PDI-P	15,506 votes

Source: Information collected by Andri W.P. from KPUD Sambas.

We should note that before the 1999 violence, the district capital was in Singkawang, and it was only since 15 July 1999 that Sambas becomes the capital of Sambas District. Also, the tension between the Dayaks and the Malays started earlier during the election of West Kalimantan Governor and that of the Bupati of Pontianak District in 1999. The office of the People's Regional (District) Council was burnt down. Afterward, the Pontianak District was divided into Pontianak and Landak Districts. Pontianak District is the Malay territory, while the Landak District is for the Dayaks. The head of Landak District is a Dayak who was accused of "orchestrating" mass riots for the burning of the aforementioned Regional Parliament office. He becomes the first Regent of Landak (Purwana, 2004:11). Soon after

the Landak District was established, positions of all echelons within the bureaucracy were quickly switched from the Malays to the hands of the Dayaks. Similarly, out of 130 candidates admitted for civil servant positions in Landak District, only 3 were Malays (Purwana, 2004:19).

The Pontianak-Landak’s territorial division was followed by a similar one between Sanggau and Sekadau and between Sintang and Melawi. As a result, we could see that Sanggau and Sintang are now known, like Bengkayang and Landak, as the “Dayak-dominated areas.” From Table 4.3, we can also see the ethnic majority and the ethnicity of the regent/mayor in each regency/city in West Kalimantan.

Table 4.3. Ethnic Majority by Regency/District/City and Ethnicity of Regent/Major

Regency[District]/City	Ethnic Majority	Ethnicity of Regent/Major
Sambas	Malay	Malay
Singkawang City	Chinese	Malay
Bengkayang (formed in 1999)	Dayak	Dayak
Pontianak	Malay	Malay
Pontianak City	Malay	Malay
Landak (formed in 1999)	Dayak	Dayak
Sanggau	Dayak	Dayak
Sintang	Dayak	Dayak
Ketapang	Malay	Malay
Kapuas Hulu	Malay	Malay
Sekadau (formed in 2003)	Dayak	Malay
Melawi (formed in 2003)	Dayak-Malay	Dayak

Source: Purwana (2004:10).

The resurgence of Dayak and Malay identity has fueled conflicts that led to *pemekaran* and/or territorial division between the Dayak and the Malay. Whether this would be followed by future conflict or not would largely depend upon how well these two parties could resolve the 'power sharing' problems in relation to the idea of *putera daerah* ('local son' or 'son of the region', referring to a person who is native to a specific locality within the country) as well as to the issue of the Dayak's indigenous rights, which is currently widely discussed at the local, regional, and national levels.

The population by ethnic group is now one of the bases for claiming political sharing in West Kalimantan and in the Sambas District, in particular. Since the absence of the Madurese in Sambas, the competition in the political arena includes only three ethnic groups, namely Malay, Dayak, and Chinese. With ethnic composition of West Kalimantan Malay up to 79.64% (361,615 people), the Malay has claimed most of executive positions in Sambas, from *bupati* (head of district) down to *kepala bagian* (head of district's technical department). In the same manner, positions in the legislative body (DPRD) are held by Malays. One source said that the Dayak were not happy with the situation, and so they stated that they would like to join the Bengkayang District, or even Sarawak. However, some Malays argue that Sambas population is dominantly Malay, so the Dayak should not compete with the Malay, since by number they would be less powerful. In Census 2000, the Dayak was recorded as the third biggest group in Sambas (4.96% or 21,287 people) after the Chinese (11.07% or 50,241 people).

Table 4.4. Ethnicity/Locality of Party Members

Party Name	No,	Party Member	Ethnicity/Locality	No.	Party Member	Ethnicity/Locality
Golkar	1.	Drs. H Husin Kamarudin	Malay/Sambas	6.	Muazah Al Adawiyah	Malay/Tebas
	2.	H. Suparto H Asnawi	Malay/Selawi-Sambas	7.	Masud Sulaiman (Wakil Ketua)	Malay/Teluk Keramat
	3.	Chadari Eka Saputra	Malay/Selakau	8.	Sarmudi Khaidir	Malay/Teluk Keramat
	4.	Minhad Zulfan	Malay/Semparo	9.	Asbeni S. sos	Malay/Teluk Keramat
	5.	Hermansyah Ambon	Malay/Jawai	10.	Yusnadi M Amin	Malay/Paloh
PDIP	1.	Uray Barudin Idris (Ketua DPRD)	Malay Sambas	6.	Darso	Malay-Javanese/Sentebang
	2	Almanar	Malay/Sejangkung	7.	Feri Solihin Imran SH	Malay/Tebas, Mother: Chinese
	3.	Edi Rambi	Malay/Selakau	8.	Eliantisna Amd	Malay/ Teluk Keramat
	4.	Erwin Saputra	Malay Pemangkat, Wife: Sundanese	9.	Dedi S Helmi	Malay/Paloh
	5.	Muhammad Syarif	Malay/Semparo			
PPP	1.	Abdul Kadir Azis	Malay-Arab/Sambas	3.	Hidayat Hadaran	Malay/Jawai
	2.	Uray Edward	Malay/Pemangkat	4.	Usman Syafii (Wakil Ketua)	Malay/Paloh

Party Name	No.	Party Member	Ethnicity/Locality	No.	Party Member	Ethnicity/Locality
PKS	1.	Eko Suprianto SP	Malay-Javanese/Sambas	3.	Sri Gunawan	Malay/Tebas
	2.	Rusli M Yusuf	Malay/Ngambang-Selakau			
PAN	1.	H. Muhaeni Umar SE	?/Sambas, Wife: Malay	3.	Mulyadi H Jantan SE	Malay/Tebas
	2.	Trisno	Malay/Pemangkat	4.	Suherman	Malay/Teluk Keramat
PBB	1.	Husni Tobier	Malay/Selakau	3.	Asep Dedi	Sundanese/Teluk Keramat, Wife: Malay
	2.	Syahril Tonggot	Malay/Jawai			
PBR	1.	H. Hairuddin	Malay/Pemangkat	3.	Tahmid Majiddin	Malay/Teluk Keramat
	2.	Suryadi	Malay/Jawai			
P. Demokrat	1.	Ni Ketut Indrawati	Balinese/Teluk Keramat-Subah			
PPD	1.	Almizan SE	Malay/Sejangkung			
PDK	1.	Sumadi Jirin	Malay/Jawai			

Note: 1st Voting area (DAPIL I): Sambas, Selawi, Sunglasses, Subah; DAPIL II: Selakau, Pemangkat, Semparo; DAPIL III: Tebas, Jawai, Tekarang; DAPIL IV: Teluk Keramat, Paloh, Galing, Sajingan Besar. Names in blue: party members with non-local ethnicity.

Source: Kalimantan Review (No. 106, 2004, 11)

If we break down the background of all members of DPRD in Sambas by party, we could see ten members are from Golkar, nine from PDIP, four each from PPP and PAN, three each from PKS, PBB, and PBR, and one each from PPD, PD, and PPDK (Kalimantan Review, No. 110, 2004, 31)³². Other information is that 38 are Muslims and one is Hindu. The vote received by the president nominated by the party was as follows: 52,179 votes for Golkar (Wiranto-Wahid), 92,450 for PDIP (Mega-Hasyim), 23,384 for PAN (Amin-Siswono), 24,481 for PPP (Hamzah-Agum), and 36,621 for PD (SBY-MJK) (Kalimantan Review, No. 108, 2004, 44). Table 4.4 gives detailed information about all DPRD members' party, ethnicity, and locality they represent. One of the informants mentioned that almost all members are Malay or have a Malay kinship connection. However, they came from different sub-districts that were not occupied solely by Malays. The 1999 conflict has influenced the representative selection process within each political party.

It should be noted that although the difference in Sambas' situation before and after the 1999 violence, in particular, could be seen clearly from what has changed politically in the area, this should not be taken literally to mean that the differences were due to the conflict, because we could not say much about the 'pre-conflict' condition of power relations in Sambas. It is obvious that, learning from their past experiences that gambling and alcohol could trigger conflict and violence, the Sambas people, according to some informants, are now seriously fighting those two social diseases. In many villages, we could find several announcement boards saying that that village is free from alcohol and gambling (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:400). In the economic field, beside trying to re-develop *jeruk*, the Sambas government also makes an effort to develop across-the-border

32 The record made by Kalimantan Review did not include PBB, and the number of PDIP representatives was recorded as ten, not nine.

transportation, from Sambas to Kuching, Malaysia, by setting up a fast ferryboat between Sintete (at Pemangkat Sub-district) and Sibul. This is to attract Malaysian investors to Sambas. The port will become the southern Sambas' economic development center, covering Selakau, Pemangkat, Tebas, and Jawai Sub-districts. All these efforts are intended to make Sambas the border city of Malaysia more competitive (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:402).

C. Chronology of Decentralization: Sambas, Bengkayang, Singkawang, etc.

Before and during the 1999 conflict, Sambas and Bengkayang were united under Sambas District with its capital city in Singkawang. Sambas and Bengkayang themselves were a sub-district/residency, or "*kecamatan*." However after 1999, the capital city of Sambas district was moved to Sambas city, and on 20 April 1999, Bengkayang, including Singkawang City, was separated from Sambas and was turned into a new district (Pemerintah Kabupaten Bengkayang, n.d.). With Act No. 12, on 21 June 2001, Singkawang was established as an autonomous city (Pemerintah Kota Singkawang, n.d.). From the Table 4.5, we could see how the boundaries of each area changed through the comparison between the present and previous territories in Sambas, Bengkayang and Singkawang City.

Table 4.5. Present and Previous Territories of Sambas District

District/City	Present Territory	Historical background before 1964 ^{*)}	Previous Territory
1		Sambas District (UU No. 27/1959)	Covering Singkawang, Pemangkat, Sambas and Bengkayang Residencies.
2 Sambas District	Selakau, Pemangkat, Tebas, Jawai, Sambas, Sejangkung, Teluk Karmat, Galing, Sekura and Paloh	Sambas Residency	Pemangkat, Tebas up north, covering the territory which is part of Sambas.
3 Singkawang City	Covering Singkawang City, which at the moment is divided into five sub-districts: South, East, North, West, and Central Singkawang	Singkawang Residency	Sungai Duri (the present Sungai Duri and Cap Kala), Samalantan (the present Samalantan and Monterado), Selakau (part of Sambas today)
4 Bengkayang District	Sungai Duri, Cap Kala, Monterado, Samalantan, Sei Betung, Bengkayang, Teriak, Lumar, Ledo, Sanggau Ledo, Suti Semarang, Siding, Seluas and Jagoi Babang	Bengkayang Residency	Bengkayang District (the present Bangkayang and Sei Betung), Ledo (Ledo and Lumar) to the north, covering the territory that is part of Bengkayang today

Source: from several interviews – i.e. Simu and Alep Gompeng, old Dayak figures, the first generation of Dayak teachers, and ex-Assistant of Resident of Samalantan between 1961-1964.

*) The residency system was abolished in 1963.

The Institute of Dayakology's study on "Diversity of sub-ethnic groups and language in West Kalimantan" (Institut Dayakologi, 2004) shows that in Bengkayang and Sambas, basically, there are seven Dayak sub-ethnic groups. However, if they are divided into

customary regions, the total number of such groupings is 29. The largest one is Bakati', which covers Bakati' Riok, Bakati' Sara, Bakati' Kanayatn Satango, Bakati' Rara, Bakati' Taria, Bakati' Lape, Bakati' Payutn', and Bakati' Lumar (eight groups). Bakati' Rara is the most widely distributed group, from Bengkayang to Pendarengan, Kampung Tiang Tanjung to Bukit Bawang. They moved to Sanggau Ledo due to internal and external conflict with the Chinese *kongsi* (when, in 1853, Sultan Sambas asked the Dayak to help him attack the Chinese).

As the other sub-ethnic groups, we could list: Jagoi, Liboi, Sikukng, Tamong, Taweg/Tawang, Kowotn, Butok, Tadietn/Tadan, Bi Pah Toi, Suti Bamayo' (at the border of Landak-Bengkayang), Sengayan/Kumba, Subah Lampahuk, Sebiha', Palayo, Banyadu' Taria, Iban, Salako Garantukng, Capala, Badamea, Sawak, and Salako Badamea. Badamea in Salamantan has the same language as that of Salako in Sajingan, and its percentage is quite small, only 4,8%. It should also be noted that the term Kanayatn was originally used to refer to Bakati' and Banyadu'. For the whole of Bekati, the term Kanayatn is the same as Kanayat and Kanayan, but later all sub-ethnic groups in Pontianak, Landak, and Bengkayang districts, including Dayak Baahe and Banana, identified themselves as Kanayatn, except for Kanayatn Bukit, who, when in their own area, refused to be called Dayak Kanayatn or Kanayatn Bukit, and preferred to name themselves Dayak Bukit (especially those who are living close to Bukit Talaga) (Institut Dayakologi, 2004).

D. “Pemekaran” Sambas to Bengkayang

Bengkayang was formed after the 1999 violence, on 20 April 1999 under the Act No. 10, 1999 (Pemerintah Kabupaten Bengkayang, n.d.). Some people believe that the separation of Bengkayang from Sambas was due to the 1999 violence, but others might argue that the

separation plan had been made long before the incident, particularly since Sambas District has been appointed as one of the pilot areas for the implementation of Government Regulation No. 8/1995, which delegates part of governance affairs to 26 pilot districts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that part of the governance affairs that were being delegated are those affairs that were previously handled by technical departments under the authority of the central government, such as agriculture, husbandry & fishery management, as well as various bureaucratic administrations, like birth certificates. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the delegation of those technical affairs has led to the plan of separation for Bengkayang long before 1999, or at least since 1995. But if we consider the financial sides of all those management activities, as well as 'local' conflicts that might be involved in the process, it is still possible that Bengkayang has long been planning its separation.

Bengkayang is the smallest district in West Kalimantan after Singkawang City and Pontianak City. Its total area is 5,396.30 km², and at the beginning it consisted of ten sub-districts (Samalantan, Sungai Raya, Bengkayang, Monterado, Ledo, Sanggau Ledo, Suti Semarang, Teriak, Seluas, and Jagoi Babang), but in 2004/2005, it was reorganized into 14 sub-districts, adding Cap Kala, Sei Betung, Lumar, and Siding Sub-districts (see Table 4.5.). Capkala was separated from Sungai Raya, Sei Betung from Samalantan, and Lumar from Ledo.

According to some informants, Bengkayang as a new district has to struggle very hard to develop itself since Singkawang City—as its main source of income—decided to be independent in 2001. Its economic activities, which in 2002 only reached Rp755.1 billion, could not support Bengkayang as a district, nor could it be said about improving the lives of its population, which half of them could be categorized as poor (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:493). According to Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS, 2002), the number of the poor in

Bengkayang was 59.1 thousands people or 16.92%, with poverty line of Rp96,583 per capita per month (BPS, 2002:21).

Like in Sambas, rubber and palm oil are two of the main products of Bengkayang that its people depend upon. 60% of its people depend on agriculture, which in 2002 amounted to Rp287.7 billion; 42% of the amount was originated from plantation, with oil palm as its main commodity. By engaging 5,192 households in its production, in 2002 Bengkayang was able to produce 10,896 tonne palm oil (fresh fruit bunch) from the area of 8,191 ha, implying an output of 2 tonnes per household, which is absurdly low. Rubber, as another main commodity, in year 2002 has produced 23,617 tonne from the area of 44,786 ha. Labour employed amounted to 46,757 households. The average for rubber, around 500 kg per household, is again very low, though not as low as for oil palm (BPS, 2002:21). Productive land of rubber is 44,786 ha (of total area 62,089 ha) which in 2002 produces 23,617.17 tonnes or 527,33 kg/ha/year (data 2003 as collected by Andri W.P. from Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Kabupaten Bengkayang). In 2002, it was recorded that 46,757 farmer families earned their living by working at rubber plantations. Meanwhile, according to the same report, the productive area of palm oil has reached 8,191 ha with production in 2002 reaching 10,869 tonnes or 1,326.94 kg/ha/year (BPS, 2002:21). The oil palm business involves 5,192 farmer families, and one of the private companies that operates in Bengkayang controls 15,000 ha and already has a crude palm oil (CPO) factory which accepts local people's production from within and outside Bengkayang, such as the Pontianak District. However, the above estimation of productivity per ha/year could not be right. From the Malaysian experience, the average yield per ha per year should be around 12–15 tonnes, rising to about 20 tonnes from year 8 onwards; otherwise, at 1.3 tonnes per year of fruit, everyone would go bankrupt. Obviously, not all 8,191 ha are in production.

With the area of 5,396.30 km² and the total population of 176,657 people (Census 2000), Bengkayang actually could not depend only on those two products. Therefore as a whole, there are several other commodities that are potential to be developed, namely coconut, “hybrida” or hybrid pepper³³, clover, cacao, coffee, corn, and *kemiri* (candlenut). Fishery sector also has some potential, particularly at Sungai Raya District which has 40,5 km coastal line. Meanwhile, the trading sector contributes to the circulation Rp180 million per day, mostly come from rubber trading. In the future, it is expected that corn (for cattle feed), which is produced in the eastern part of Bengkayang (from Ledo district to Jagoi Babang), is no longer required to be sold in Pontianak because a factory will be built in Bengkayang soon. Perhaps they could export it directly to Malaysia when they could regulate cross-border traffic at Jagoi Babang District, with a border area of 62 km.

Bengkayang’s potential for economic development, according to one informant who works at local government office, is actually in mining resources, such as manganese, which could be identified from the black soil seen in the Bupati office’s backyard. Unfortunately, he could not find the required map to prove his assumption. The mining department only reported about class C “stone” mining companies, which have almost all stopped their operation. Our informant believes that since the companies lost most of their workers, so the workers must have been Madurese, who were well known as very diligent stone-breaker.

Conflicts in the economic field, like in Sambas, are mostly related to palm oil companies. It was recorded that there were conflicts in 1990 with PT Ceria Prima (CP) and since 1988 with PT Mitra Inti

33 According to some people in Sanggau Ledo, their area produces pepper that is mostly sold to Malaysia through the border at Seluas District. It is only 50 km from Sanggau Ledo.

Sejahtera Plantation (MISP)³⁴ According to the report, PT MISP opened a road in 1984, although it did not start opening land until 1990 for three years. It now has several conflicts with Dayak Bakati in Danti Village, Kampong Sapa, Sangat Molo, Sakong, Teboa, Sentalang, Lalang, and Yadis at Ledo Sub-district (Kalimantan Review, No. 98, 2003, 29). PT CP came in 1990 to offer the palm oil business to the people, but it was not until 1997 that they started planting. Today, from the 11,000 ha of land concession they received, they have opened 75% of the area, but only 1,500 ha was planted (Kalimantan Review, No. 98, 2003, 29). In 1995, they planned to make Sebalos traditional forest area into a palm oil plantation, but were rejected by the local people. In 2004, the conflict was reopened because of the involvement of the village head of Senanga Kampong at the border of Sanggau Ledo Sub-district and Seluas Sub-district, who asked the company to include their land as “plasma land for oil palm” (Kalimantan Review, No. 112, 2004, 66). The conflict became very intense when members of the Brimob Kompi I Pelopor were involved on behalf of the company against local people at Kampong Sebalos, Sango Village, Sanggau Ledo Sub-district.


According to Andri W.P.’s investigation, several months before the Sanggau Ledo violence, at Ledo District (now Lumar District), particularly at Sempayuk Sub-village at Belimbing Village, a group of hundreds of people had conducted a protest against *hutan tanaman industry* (HTI) by attacking PT Nityasa Idola (NI), a HTI company. The attack destroyed the company’s canteen and nursery area, which resulted in the company’s leaving the area. The mass attack took place on 1 November 1995, involving 300 people from seven

34 Another source indicates that PT CP, which is located in Sanggau Ledo and Sambas Sub-districts, controls an TM area of 570 ha, while PT MISP Plant I at Sanggau Ledo and Sejangkung Sub-districts controls 6,298 TM area and 1,772 ha TBM (Kalimantan Review, No. 101, 2004, 8).

dusun (kampong) at Belimbing and Tiga Berkat Villages, Ledo Sub-district in the pre-division Sambas District. The people rejected the company's business scheme in their area.

This action was similar to that occurred in Ketapang, Pontianak and Sanggau Districts since 1994, either to reject HTI (legal or illegal) and HPH companies. Data from Kalimantan Review (No. 101, 2004, 9, based on data presented at www.aphi-pusat.com, 2002), has listed 36 HPH in West Kalimantan which covers 4,811,750 ha, ranging from the lowest 40 ha to the highest 294,000 ha by PT Suka Jaya Makmur (Alas Kusuma). This listing does not include HPHH 100 ha, whose permit was issued by *bupati* or *walikota*, arguing that the village head and his secretary had received the company without consulting them (for details on this conflict, see Andasputra, 1999: 9–12). According to Heidhues (2001:144), the Belimbing conflict drew international attention from Lembaga Bela Banua Talino, a Dayak Human rights agency which is an expansion of the Institute of Dayakology in Pontianak.

At that time, there were rarely a Madurese worker working for the company, so it seems implausible to assume an ethnic factor as the underlying cause of the people's action. However, according to some informants, the most interesting similarities between the Sempayuk case and the Sanggau Ledo violence are that both violence broke up in Ledo Sub-district, and the violent actors came from Ledo. (see the mapping of Madurese's settlement in Sanggau Ledo in Figure 4.1).



Note: The marking of light blue, dark blue, and red in area XI (Sanggau Ledo) was added by Andri W.P. to show the Madurese's settlement area (red), as well as transmigration complexes (light and dark blue). It appears that the Madurese live between two groups of transmigrants. The Figure also indicates the closeness of Sanggau Ledo's violent conflict with the Sempayuk incident, i.e. mass attacks on a HTI company, at Ledo (area IX).

Source: The map and additional information were acquired by Andri W.P. from KPUD dan BPS Bengkayang (Election Board and Statistics Office of Bengkayang District).

Figure 4.1. Madurese Settlement In Sanggau Ledo

One of the Sempayuk incident's leading actors, namely BS, was arrested by a special task force of the army, and was charged with murder during the attacks on the Madurese. It is also interesting to note that the Sempayuk incident, too, has raised Petrus SA, one of the three leading actors, to become a local figure in Ledo. Previously, he was a community organizer for Lembaga Bela Banua Talino, which is

based in Pontianak. Petrus who was also known as the Dayak Bekati youth's figure later joined PDIP and was elected into West Kalimantan legislatures as the youngest member. In May 2003, he was forced to step down from his position as the Chairman of DPRD Bengkayang by the masses because he asked too many facilities while ignoring the people's interests (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2004, p. 496). The mass was backed up by several political elites. Afterwards, Petrus was fired from PDIP as well. However in 2005 Pilkada (*pemilihan kepala daerah* or regional elections), together with Kasiyo as his partner, he once again emerged as a political figure, which was supported by 11 small parties of Bengkayang to become a candidate of *bupati*. In the end, he lost it. By emphasizing the role of these two main (Dayak) actors, several observers have simply concluded that it is precisely such experience of being organized that has made the mobilization of the local (Dayak) people for the Sanggau Ledo conflict easy.

Perhaps it is also significant to note that Ledo Sub-district is the only sub-district in Bengkayang District that has been divided twice, firstly into Ledo and Suti Semarang Sub-districts. Secondly, in 2004/2005, the newly formed Ledo Sub-district was re-divided into Ledo and Lumar Sub-districts. The fact that the previous area of Ledo Sub-district is quite large could perhaps allow us to safely presume that, a huge problem of the lack of development and employment in the area that was faced for many years by the Ledo people, later on, has worked as the foundation for frustration and motivation for their rioting acts.

Bengkayang, whose total population of 2003 was 193,653, is dominated by Dayak with 55.55% of the total population (or 98,132 people), while Malays composed of 20.21% (or 35,696 people) and Chinese with 9.87% (or 17,440 people). For the 2004 election, there are 117,035 voters registered in Bengkayang. Meanwhile, the composition of party members in DPRD Bengkayang is as follows: five members each from Golkar and PDIP, two members each from

PD, PNBK, PDS, PPDK, and PKPI, and one member each from PAN, PBR, Partai Pelopor, PBSD, and PPP 1 (Kalimantan Review, No. 110, 2004, 31). For the complete list of names of these DPRD members, see Table 4.6. below.

Table 4.6. Party Members who became DPRD members of Bengkayang District

Party Name	No	Party Member	No	Party Member
Golkar	1.	Yakobus Niron (born in Riung, live in Bengkayang)	4.	Amkhan S. Pd Catholic/ Previous member of DPRD BKY/SLTA
	2.	Pasti (born in Siraba, live in Monterado)	5.	Lukanus Lukas Pasalima Catholic/ Previous member of DPRD BKY/SGO Skw
	3.	Heronius (born in Pemangkat, live in Samalantan)		
PDIP	1.	Yohanes Antonius Dopong (born in Pontianak, live in Bengkayang)	4.	Mulyadi SH Islam/Private-employee/S1
	2.	Sebastianus Darwis SE (born in Singkawang, live in Bengkayang)	5.	Haritus Alias Alexander Haris Protestant/ Businessman-contractor/SLTA

Party Name	No	Party Member		No	Party Member
	3.	Thony Haryadi (born in Serukam, live in Bengkayang)	Buddha/Self-employed/SLTA		
P Demokrat	1.	Yulius Nesor (born in Ledo, live in Bengkayang)	Protestant/ Pensioned PNS/ SPG (Teacher School)	2.	PA Asri Protestant/ Pensioned PNS/KPG
PNBK	1.	Sarina S. Pd (born and live in Bengkayang)	Protestant/ Private-employee/S1	Suryatman Gidot S. Pd	Protestant/ Previous member of DPRD BKY/S1
PDS	1.	Dwi Joko Prihanto S.Th (born in Jumo, live in Samalantan)	Protestant/ Priest/S1	2.	Radianus S. Si Protestant/ Private-employee/ SLTA
PDK	1.	Herman	Protestant/ Private-employee/SLTA	2.	Roni Protestant/ Private-employee/ SMEA
PKPI	1.	Martinus Ujang SE	Catholic/ Previous member of DPRD BKY/S1	2.	Kornelius Tanduk Catholic /Farmer/SLTA
PAN	1.	M. Yunus	Islam/Previous member of DPRD BKY/ SLTA		
PBR	1.	Junaidi	Islam/Private-employee/SLTA		
P. Pelopor	1.	Jumali SE	Protestant/ Private-employee/S1		

Party Name	No	Party Member	No	Party Member
PBSD	1.	Yohanes Y		Protestant/ Private-employee/SLTA
PPP	1.	H Suhada Hadran		Islam/Previous member of DPRD BKY/ SUPM Ptk

Source: Kalimantan Review (No. 106, 2004, 10). Data on their religion and occupational status were acquired by Andri W.P. from Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Bengkayang District. Bengkayang, with 117.234 voters, was divided into three voting areas: Bengkayang I (11 seats), Bengkayang II (6 seats) and Bengkayang III (8 seats).

From their names and religion (Catholic and Protestant), it is quite evident that more than half of the members are Dayak—all Golkar, all PKPI, all PBSD, all P. Demokrat, at least one of PDK, probably one of PDS, one of PNBK, and at least two of PDIP. Based on educational level, only seven of them have *sarjana* (S1) degree, which is equal to a BA degree abroad, while the majority of them are senior high school (SLTA) or equivalent. Nine of them were previous members of DPRD Bengkayang, while another ten are employees of a private company.

Meanwhile, from all the names nominated for pilkada (see **Table 4.7**), we could see that the majority of them are also Dayak, indicating how “Dayakness” has become very important. However, to some extent, the pairing strategy seemed to have considered the importance of Javanese’s votes when we found that a Javanese name, such as Kasiyo, was also listed as a candidate for vice *bupati*. The pairings are interesting in view of the ethnic composition of Bengkayang where, as mentioned above, Javanese make up less than 10% of the population (as do Chinese), whereas Malays make up 20%.

Table 4.7. Candidate for Bupati, Vice Bupati, and Their Backgrounds

Candidate for Bupati	Background	Candidate for Vice Bupati	Background	Notes
1. Mikael Andjioe, S.Ip., MBA	Ex Bupati Sanggau, Dayak, TNI veteran.	1. Drs. H. Edy R Yacoub	Lecturer in Pontianak higher institution, born in Sungai Pangkalan Village in Sungai Raya District. He was one of those who suggested <i>pemekaran</i> of Sungai Raya from Bengkayang when Singkawang became a separate district in 2000/2001	Andjioe was the richest among all candidates, so some people were afraid that he would use his wealth for money politics to win the pilkada.
2. Drs. SM Kpahat or Kaphat	See 1997 Election, in DPR/MPR-RI, there was Drs SM Kaphat from PDI. He is a Dayak Bekati* who has become a society leader since New Order introduced three-party system. He is the Head of PDI which during the New Order was the main political choice of the Dayak in West Kalimantan, especially in Bengkayang.	2. A.R. Simon	Intellectual and Dayak Society Leader	
3. Petrus SA	Ex-Head of DPRD who was forced to step down by mass in 2003/2004 as well as being fired from PDIP. Graduated from agricultural school in Singkawang he was the youngest legislative in West Kalimantan. He was involved in demonstration against HTI at Sempayuk Village in 1996. He was a local cadre trained by one of the big NGOs in Pontianak. He is quite a capable person because he was able to make 11 small parties to support him for the pilkada.	3. Kasiyo	Ex-Sambas BKBKN pensioner before <i>pemekaran</i>	This pair was supported by a small number of people inland as well as a small number of Muslims, particularly form Teriak Sub-district.
4. Drs. Moses Ahie Msi	Ex-Vice Bupati of Bengkayang	Uray Heriansyah	Camat Sungai Raya	The pair was popular among the Dayak, the Malay and even the Javanese. They were considered as a strong candidate for pilkada.

* Dayak Bekati is a Dayak sub-ethnic group which inhabits Bengkayang District, together with Dayak Bâahe, Dayak Banyadu, Dayak Bajare and so on.

5. Jacobus Luna	The present <i>bupati</i> , Dayak Bekati, Christian	Suryatman Gidot, S.Pd	He is a Dayak Bekati, Christian, Member of DPRD Bengkayang (see Table 4.6) and Head of <i>Fraksi</i> /PNBK	The pair was believed to have difficulty in gaining the Malay, the Javanese and the Muslim's votes due to their Christianity. The basis for constituency is the Dayak and some Chinese at Sungai Raya. The Malay thought that the pair would like to prove that Christian and Bekati were the majority group in Bengkayang.
6. Marseleus Uthan	A person from the West Kalimantan <i>Yayasan Kesejahteraan Sosial</i> , which is under the auspices of West Kalimantan <i>Keuskupan</i>	Goentomo	A Malay from Singkawang, although his name is similar to a Javanese.	
7. Apollonius Welly	These people obviously failed to run for pilkada, because they were not signed up as the formal candidates, although Kalimantan Review listed them as one before.			
8. Ir. Ansfriidus J. Andjioe				
9. Martinus				
10. Drs. Hendrikus Klemen				
11. Zakaria SH				
12. Martinus S				

Source: Kalimantan Review (No. 113, 2005, 10); and field report by Andri W.P.

In general, the ethnic-religious issues that were spread out during the campaign could be categorized into three groups, i.e. Dayak vs Malay, Muslim vs Christian, and Bekati vs Ba'ahe³⁵. Although Malays make up about 20% of the total population, it does not appear that there were many Dayak-Malay pairings, except for Moses Ahie-Uray Heriansyah and Marseleus Uthan-Goentomo. Perhaps this is related to the fact that one of the reasons that Bengkayang was separated from Sambas is to uphold its ethnic majority, namely the Dayak. Not all candidates used ethnic issues for their own purposes; at least M. Uthan-Goentomo or SM Kaphat-A.R. Simon did not. Only Moses Ahie-Uray Heriansyah used the issue of ethnic balance, while Jacobus Luna-Suryadiman Gidot based their campaign on their Christian and Bekati identity. For each candidate's social and political background, see Table 4.6.

On May 12, 2005, the Regional Committee for Election (KPUD) decided that three of those candidates had failed the selection process because their health was considered high risk by the appointed doctor. Those three were Jacobus Luna, Andjioe, and Kasiyo. However, the decision had made the office of the Committee under attack by a group of those candidates' supporters, and they threatened to burn down the office. Many people said that the majority of them were Jacobus Luna's supporters. Jacobus Luna was the previous *bupati*, whose first period was finished on May 4, 2005. He was proposed as a candidate by PDIP. Due to pro and contra against the Committee's decision, Governor then intervened by asking the appointed doctor to explain further his recommendation that high risk health condition did not mean having problem to become candidate. At the end, the decision was annulled. The winner is Jacobus Luna. He was re-elected as *Bupati* of Bengkayang from 2005 to 2010 on the *pilkada*

35 Bekati is a Dayak subgroup that inhabits Samalantan, Sei Betung, Bengkayang, Teriak, Lumar and Ledo. While, Ba'ahe is another Dayak subgroup, which came from Landak district area, such as Pahauman, Menjalin, Karangan, Darit, etc.

of June 30th, 2005, and was formalized as *bupati* on August 10th, 2005. The following is the number of votes obtained by each candidate for the *Bupati* of Bengkayang:

- 1) Luna-Gidot, 32.029 votes
- 2) Moses-Uray, 26.421 votes
- 3) M. Andjio-Edi Yakob, 16.444 votes
- 4) Petrus-Kasiyo, 6.767 votes
- 5) SM Khapat-AR Simon, 6.087 votes
- 6) M. Uthan-Goentomo, 5.003 votes

Some people said that if Jacobus Luna were not re-elected, the investigation into corruption (the construction of government ‘one roof’ office and the clean water installation project) would be easy. Also, according to the discussion made by Muslim young people at mosques, they felt “repressed” during Jacobus Luna’s period, because the recruitment of Muslims to civil servants on the first stage in 1999/2000 was only 7–8%, while the second stage was a little bit more than 8%. However, the population of Muslims in Bengkayang reached 34,8% of the total population. The Muslims think that the leadership of Jacobus Luna and Moses Ahie³⁶ from 2000 to 2005 had closed the Muslim’s access to bureaucracy.

According to some Moslems who were interviewed, the number of Muslim in Bengkayang should be majority because there are two Moslem groups, namely the Malays and the Javanese. Therefore, they think the BPS figures do not reflect the real situation. This is also why Sungai Raya Sub-district, which is Malay-dominated, at the beginning refused to join Bengkayang. They instead joined Singkawang because they believed with Singkawang they could be better existed. If we see **Table 4.8**, we can clearly see why the Sungai

36 Due to each personal ambition to become the number one person in the Bengkayang District, for the 2005 pilkada, Luna and Moses had broken their previous partnership and each of them had taken a different partner. According to the informants, the reason is more personal, i.e. personal ambition, rather than due to ethnic or religious differences.

Raya people feel uncomfortable joining Bengkayang. As seen from the table, except for Sungai Duri and Monterado, the heads of other sub-districts are Dayak.

Table 4.8. The Majority of the Population and Ethnic Origin of Sub-district Heads

No.	Sub-district	The majority of the Population (Rough estimate)	Head	Ethnic origin	Explanation
1	Sungai Duri	Malay	Purkan	Malay	A replacement of Uray, who became a candidate for pilkada, pairing with Moses (see previous table on <i>bupati</i> and <i>vice bupati</i> Candidates)
2	Cap Kala	Dayak	Busin	Dayak	
3	Monterado	Dayak	Yusuf	Malay	
4	Samalantan	Dayak	Muksin	Dayak	Ex-Kasubag Pempdes, Bangkayang District
5	Sungai Betung	Dayak	Romi	Dayak	
6	Bengkayang	Dayak	Anastasia	Dayak	
7	Lumar	Dayak	Yan	Dayak	
8	Ledo	Dayak	Anton	Dayak	
9	Sanggau Ledo	Dayak	Frans Andot	Dayak	
10	Seluas	Dayak	Dodorikus	Dayak	
11	Jagoi Babang	Dayak	Aleksius	Dayak	
12	Siding	Dayak	Petrus Dias	Dayak	
13	Suti Semarang	Dayak	Aleksius	Dayak	
14	Teriak	Dayak	Aci Sood	Dayak	

Note: No data concerning the previous sub-district heads could be gathered.

Source: from various informants as gathered by Andri W.P., June-August 2005.

According to several informants interviewed by Andri W. P., Sungai Raya is still part of Bengkayang because of its rich natural resources. Sungai Raya is the only area within Bengkayang with direct access to the sea and to several potential nearby islands. There are also several prospective mines in Sungai Raya, such as stone, sand, and *kaolin*. For *kaolin*, it could be found particularly at Cap Kala Sub-district, i.e., at Mandor Village, which historically was known as one of the Chinese *kongsi*. It is geographically impossible for Sungai Raya to join Sambas because Singkawang is between them. It is much more logical if Sungai Raya joins Singkawang, although, according to some people, it would also be absurd for Singkawang City to have part of it larger than itself. The area of Sungai Raya amounted to 516,20 km². It should be noted that Sungai Raya Sub-district has been divided into two sub-districts, namely the (old) Sungai Raya Sub-district and the new Cap Kala Sub-district, whose population is dominantly Dayak. The Sungai Raya is located along the seashore, while the Cap Kala is in the interior, toward Monterado. Obviously, the ethnic issue will continue to divide people and places until perhaps no more divisions are possible.

Finally, it is quite intriguing to discuss Kristianus's (2011) paper on ethnic nationalism in West Kalimantan. Kristianus believes that ethnic violent conflicts in West Kalimantan that occurred between 1966/67 and 2008 were not caused by cultural differences, but were closely connected with ethnic political activities and their efforts to fight the ruling ethnic group's hegemony at particular moments when the process of general election takes place (Kristianus, 2011:166).

He divided his mapping of the relationship between ethnic violence and political events into two periods: in the first period, he saw the involvement of the ethnic Dayak in conflict (with the Chinese and later with Madurese) because they had been removed from political power, and became the hegemonized victim of the ruling elite at that time. Whilst, in the second period since 1999, it was the

Malay ethnic group who were involved in conflict (with Madurese, and later with Dayak and Chinese) because the Malays felt threaten when they lost in the political competition at the provincial level, and even being dominated by the Dayak in Bengkayang, and by the Chinese in Singkawang (Kristianus, 2011:165–166).

Even though Kristianus's assumption about Dayak-Malay-Chinese's political competitions might be valid if we observe the data presented in the preceding sections concerning the ethnic background of the ruling elites, his argument might not be appropriate for the Madurese, because there is no significant political competition with this migrant ethnic group that has been publicly reported. It is true that historically we could trace ethnic segregation between Malay and Dayak from the colonial period that continued after Indonesian Independence, that is, when a religion became a socio-political divider between Muslim Malays and non-Muslim Dayaks. Nevertheless, Kristianus's point of view that political competition between those two ethnic groups, which potently colored local politics in West Kalimantan, has implicated Madurese and Chinese as long-established ethnic migrants in the province, who could be considered to have socio-cultural proximities with the Dayaks and the Malays is quite presumptuous, because there are also several other ethnic migrants in the area beside Madurese and Chinese, such as Javanese, Sundanese, etc.

Social and Cultural Aspects of Dayak Marginalization

Our discussion about the marginalization of the Dayak in the economic and political fields is incomplete if we do not also investigate the sociocultural aspect of their position in society before the 1997 Sanggau Ledo violence, particularly in relation to their educational background. Unfortunately, we could not find any statistical data on ethnicity for that time, except for a rough estimate from the SUPAS 1995 presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Comparison between Dayak, Javanese, Madurese, and Malay in Sambas and Pontianak (in percentage)

	Dayak	Javanese	Madurese	Malay
Sambas	20.2	0.6	2.5	56.5
Pontianak	34.0	4.9	9.1	26.2

Source: BPS (1995)

From Susenas 1996 (BPS, 2012), however, we could see some changes in the age composition during that period. While the aged group composition in West Kalimantan during 1993–1996 has not much changed, in the Sambas district, the 15–19 age group has decreased from 20% in 1993 to 19% in 1994 and 1995, and again to 17% in 1996. We could also see a fluctuation among other age groups, particularly between the ages of 25–39 (see Table 5.2). Perhaps we could assume that the decrease was related to the above-mentioned *Jeruk* destruction that occurred during that period (1994/1995), which caused people to lose their jobs. These people might then choose to go outside Sambas to work, as mentioned before, either as TKI in Malaysia or as seasonal timber loggers in Riau, hence the drop in the percentages of 1994. However, as we could see, the percentage increased again in 1995, and this might be due, if the information we received was true, to the arrival of the new Madurese migrants who took the place of local people in the agricultural sector.

Table 5.2. Population aged 15–64 years old by age group in West Kalimantan and Sambas district (1993–1996)

Age Group	West Kalimantan				Sambas District			
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996
15–19	19	19	19	18	20	19	19	17
20–24	14	14	14	14	12	14	14	13
25–29	13	12	13	14	12	11	13	12
30–34	12	12	12	12	13	11	12	12
35–39	12	11	11	12	12	9	10	12
40–44	9	10	10	9	9	10	11	9
45–49	8	8	8	8	8	9	8	9
50–54	6	7	6	6	7	8	6	7
55–59	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	6

Age Group	West Kalimantan				Sambas District			
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996
60–64	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: BPS (2012)

Even though we could not compare the educational level of the Sambas population by ethnic group using Susenas 1996 (BPS, 2012), we could say that during that period, both in West Kalimantan and in the Sambas District, the percentage of those who have no schooling or primary school background has considerably decreased. For those without schooling, the percentage has decreased from 23% in 1993 to 18% in 1996 for West Kalimantan and from 20% to 18% for the Sambas district. For those in primary school, the percentage has decreased from 50% in 1993 to 48% in 1996 for West Kalimantan and from 59% to 54% for the Sambas District. It means that there were more educated youth in Sambas in 1996. Table 5.2 also shows that the percentage of those in Junior Secondary in West Kalimantan as well as in Sambas district has increased from 12% to 16% for West Kalimantan and from 11% to 15% for Sambas. Similarly, the percentage of Senior Secondary also increased from 13% to 15% for West Kalimantan and 9% to 12% for Sambas. However, compared to West Kalimantan province, the Sambas district still has a lower percentage for those in senior secondary+ or university level (see Table 5.3). Perhaps based on those facts, we could say that the increase to some extent might indicate the degree of competition (and unemployment) experienced by highly educated youth of Sambas during the economic crisis 1996. Such a fact was clearly supported by our findings on sectoral changes discussed in the previous section (Chapter III) of Socio-Economic Context of Dayak-Madurese Conflict.

Table 5.3. Population Aged 15–64 Years Old by Education Level in West Kalimantan and Sambas District (1993–1996)

Education level	West Kalimantan				Sambas District			
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996
No school	23	21	20	18	20	17	22	18
Primary	50	48	50	48	59	57	55	54
Junior Secondary	12	14	14	16	11	13	12	15
Senior Secondary	13	15	14	15	9	12	10	12
Senior Secondary+	3	3	2	3	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: BPS (2012)

These statistical results of Susenas 1996 seem to be supported by Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus (SUPAS) 1995 (BPS, 1995), which shows that all of these groups—Dayak, Javanese, Madurese, and Malay—have experienced progress on the educational level, albeit quite diverse. Fewer people aged 25–29 were without schooling, compared to the older age groups, although the percentage of Madurese ethnic origin was still higher than the others (around 60%). However, for higher level education, the Madurese were not much worse than the Dayak (both of them, for the most part, almost 100 % of those 35–40 years old or older), were at the bottom of higher education distribution; only the Malay were better, even though they still lagged behind the Javanese. This lack of formal schooling certainly influences their chances for higher occupational positions, particularly in the industrial sector, which requires skills. It seems that, as it has been concluded in the first-year report, education-wise, the Madurese are not a threat, either for the Dayak or the Malay. Thus perhaps, social and cultural explanations should be understood more through how the Dayak perceive violence.

We could return to John Bamba—the Director of the Institute of Dayakology—as an example of those who tried to explain the background of the Dayak violence from the perspective of their own (Dayak) culture. John Bamba believes that the Dayak violence is “the manifestation of frustrating inner feelings that are failed for their response by the ruling regime of the received the incorrect response” (Bamba, 2004:12). He argues that the condition of ‘not able to protect their needs and interests against other needs and interests’ has motivated the Dayak people to go with “violence as a means of settling down every complexity they encounter” (p. 12). His opinion is similar to Schiller’s (2003) explanation that, “[a]ttacks by some Dayaks against some settlers are only one part of a larger struggle for social justice, political power, and wider recognition of the value of Dayak culture”. Therefore, for John Bamba, the solution is to acknowledge Indigenous People—including the Dayak—in Indonesia. As he said,

“Rejection of the existence and application of the Adat Laws and Adat Institutions is one form to promote and create violence in society. This happens because such adat laws are not effective and receive negative responses, such that the people turn to violence [*sic!*] ways and actions” (Bamba, 2004:23).

Obviously, for the Dayak—particularly for John Bamba—the meaning of culture should be interpreted as ‘political recognition’ or ‘equality in front of the law’ rather than as cultural aspects of life such as values and norms.

Chapter VI

Why Not Ketapang?

A fact that should be raised here is that Ketapang, for the year 1994 alone, accepted more transmigrants (2,721 households or 10,500 people) compared to other areas in West Kalimantan. The highest number of these transmigrants came from East Java which might include Madurese. As we see in Table 6.1, obviously the number of the Madurese in Ketapang was larger than in Sambas. Therefore, why there has been no violence against the Madurese in Ketapang when the clashes between Dayak/Malay-Madurese broke out in Sanggau Ledo (1996/1997) and Sambas (1999)?

Table 6.1 Comparison of Dayak, Javanese, Madurese, and Malay in Sambas, Ketapang, and Pontianak (in Percentage)

	Dayak	Javanese	Madurese	Malay
Sambas	20.2	0.6	2.5	56.5
Ketapang	17.6	6.0	3.8	61.7
Pontianak	34.0	4.9	9.1	26.2

Source: BPS (1995).

Sudagung's (2001) calculation is a little bit higher, i.e., 3.9 % of the total population of Ketapang (250,547), or 9,766 people (p. 70). According to him, the oldest Madurese settlement in West Kalimantan was set up in 1902 in Kampung Mulia Kerta, Matan Hilir Selatan Sub-district, Ketapang District, by *Bapak* Kasi. The second settlement in Sungai Kinyil in the same sub-district was pioneered by *Bapak* Kendin in 1906 (p. 72). The estimated number of Madurese, based on the Local (District) Government Bureau's calculation of 1979, in each sub-district of Ketapang District, can be seen in Table 6.2.


Table 6.2 Number of Madurese in Sub-districts

Sub-district	Number of Madurese in Sub-district (person)	Percentage
Matan Hilir Utara	1,485	3.8
Matan Hilir Selatan	5,418	16.4
Sukadana	1,091	8.9
Simpang Hilir	931	3.1
Kendawangan	821	5.0
Sandai	6	0.03
Tumbang Titi	2	0.01
Merau	1	0.007
Jelai Hulu	1	0.009
Manis Mata	10	0.08
Total	9,766	

Source: Local (District) Government Bureau's calculation of 1979, as acquired by Andri W.P.

Also from Figure 6.1, we can see that most of the Madurese were/are living in shoreline areas, not far from Ketapang City (the district capital). Only a few of them are living in the inland area of

Ketapang. Ketapang District, which is located on the south coast of West Kalimantan, is about 478 km from Pontianak. Most people travel from Pontianak to Ketapang on a ferry. Those who have visited it might tell us that it is not easy to go around the area because of its limited transportation, as well as due to the bad condition of its roads.



Source: This map was copied by Andri W.P. from Ketapang's Election Committee Office.

Figure 6.1. Ketapang Map with Sub-district Names

However, whether it is also the reason for violence not to occur—as stated in *Profil Daerah Kabupaten and Kota* (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003, p. 404), “compare to other districts and city in West Kalimantan which was shaken by collective violence, Ketapang could be categorized as the safest area”—I think perhaps it is only to

simplify the matter. It would be better to look for other factors that influenced the decision of Ketapang's uninvolved in the 1999 violence, particularly since Ketapang is also an ex-Malay Kingdom, with Malay as the majority. Their position as the majority is reflected in the large proportion of Malays in the Local People's Council (DPRD), which has been up to 70% for the period of 1999–2004 and of 2004–2009 (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 List of Names of Ketapang People's Council

Party Name	1997–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009
PPP	1. Muzakir A. Arahman (Malay/Muslim)	1. Sugiarto Husin (Malay/Muslim)	1. Fenri Herwandi (Malay/Muslim)
	2. A. Habib Azan (Malay/Muslim)	2. Hisyam Yusuf (Malay/Muslim)	2. Nazadola, SH (Malay/Muslim)
	3. H. A. Hamid (Malay/Muslim)	3. M. Saleh (Malay/Muslim)	3. Sahrani (Malay/Muslim)
	4. Salim Ismail (Malay/Muslim)	4. Hazran (Malay/Muslim)	4. Abdul Sani, SH, MM (Malay/Muslim)
	5. Sugiarto Husin (Malay/Muslim)	5. Abdullah Nuriman (Malay/Muslim)	5. Sauqi (deceased) (Malay/Muslim)
		6. Zainudin. SE (Malay/Muslim)	
GOLKAR	1. Drg, Djoko Hartono Chair, 1997-1999	1. Rahmat Sutoyo, SE (Malay/Muslim)	1. Rachmat Sutoyo (Malay/Muslim)
	2. H. Nawawi, BA (Muslim)	2. Ibrahim Dahlan (Malay/Muslim)	2. Ibrahim Lokani (Malay/Muslim)
	3. Paulus Lanjak	3. Anastasius Bantang (Dayak/Catholic)	3. Drs. Marcel (Dayak/Catholic)
	4. Muzakir Usman	4. Irvan Masyad, BBA (Malay/Muslim)	4. Irvan Masyad (Malay/Muslim)
	5. Ir. Sunaji	5. M. Taufik Bustami (Malay/Muslim)	5. Hasilan S.Pd (Malay/Muslim)

Party Name	1997–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009
	6. Fadjar Suwarno	6. M. Hadi Mulyono Upas, SH (Malay/Muslim)	6. Abdul Karim (Malay/Muslim)
	7. Uti Syamsul Rahman	7. M. Farhan D. Has (Malay/Muslim)	7. A. Agus Sidik, S.Ip (Malay/Muslim)
	8. Pajarto		8. Syamsidi, BA (Malay/Muslim)
	9. Ruslan Hamzah (Malay/Muslim)		9. Ruslan Hamzah (Malay/Muslim)
	10. Drs. Iyan Paulus	8. Drs. HF Radon. K (Dayak/Catholic)	10. Martin Rantan (Dayak/Catholic)
	11. Morkes Effendi (Batak/Muslim)	9. Morkes Effendi, Siagian (Batak/Muslim) Chair, 1999-2000	
	12. Ny. Yulianan Anem	10. Ny. Sutirah Sya'ati Marwan (Malay/Muslim)	11. Maria Magdalena Lili (Dayak/Catholic)
	13. Ahmad. MS	11. A Malik, A.Y (Malay/Muslim)	12. Halipuddin (Malay/Muslim)
	14. Imran		13. Dr. Herwani (Malay/Muslim)
	15. M. Rimbit		
	16. Heru Siswanto	12. Hendra Gunadi (Malay/Muslim)	14. Hendra Gunadi (Malay/Muslim)
	17. Misraji		
	18. Drs FX Panta Silaban (Batak)		
	19. Kadarisman Bersah (Malay/Muslim)	13. Kadarisman Bersah (Malay/Muslim)	15. Kadarisman Bersah (Malay/Muslim)
	20. Asmaran Bidin		
	21. H. Hayat Noor (Muslim)		

Party Name	1997–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009
PDI	22. Mustafa Gen (Malay/Muslim)	14. Mustafa Gen (Malay/Muslim)	
	23. Amir Lukman Hakim, BBA		
	1. Yohanes Djajah, BA	1. Hieronimus Aphen (Dayak /Catholic)	
ABRI / TNI-Polri	2. Zarkasi YS		
	3. Geronta		
	1. Letkol Inf Sri Suwelo Dijoyo	1. Kol. Inf. Suyadi, SP, S.Sos (Muslim)	
	2. Mayor Inf. Sudadi (Muslim)	2. Letkol Inf Sudadi (Muslim)	
	3. Mayor Inf. Mugiyono		
	4. Kapten Inf. Sagino		
	5. Kapten CAJ Drs J. Sihotang (Batak)		
	6. Kapten Inf Cipta Ginting (Batak)		
	7. Mayor Polisi Supono, BA (Muslim)	3. Kompol Supono (Muslim)	
	8. Lettu Laut Rudi Kaunang (Muslim)	4. Lettu Laut (S) Rudy Kaunang (Muslim)	
PDIP		1. Yordanus (Dayak /Catholic)	1. Teris Yohanes (Dayak /Catholic)
		2. Kristoporos Popo, S. Pd (Dayak /Catholic)	2. Yamani (Malay/Muslim)
		3. Ignatius Irawan (Dayak /Catholic)	3. Al Husaini (Malay/Muslim)

Party Name	1997–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009
		4. Yohanes Suparjiman (Javanese /Catholic)	4. Yohanes Supardjiman (Javanese /Catholic)
		5. Franseda (Dayak /Catholic)	5. Darius Ivo Elmoswat (Dayak /Catholic)
		6. Amansius (Dayak /Catholic)	6. Amansius (Dayak/Islam)
		7. Bastian (Malay/Muslim)	7. Bastian (Malay/Muslim)
		8. Ny. Hartati, M. Syamli (Malay/Muslim)	
PBB		Ir. Masfar (Malay/Muslim)	
PAN		Razali Ahmad (Malay/Muslim) Chair, 2000-2004	Syafrudin, HM (Malay/Muslim)
PP		Abdul Aen (Malay/Muslim)	
PBI		Susanti, A.Md (Dayak /Catholic)	
PDKB		Mikael Aloysius Suti, BA (Dayak /Catholic)	
PKB		Hamdy HA Rani (Malay/Muslim)	
PK		Syamsumin Sulaiman (Malay/Muslim)	
PBR			1. Sakrani (Malay/Muslim)
			2. H. Firdaus. M.S (Malay/Muslim)
PDS			Ir. Paulus Tan (China)

Party Name	1997–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009
PPDK			1. Hadi Mulyono Upas, SH (Malay/Muslim)
			2. Fajar Kusma Jaya (Malay/Muslim)
			3. P. Maryono.M, S.Sos (Dayak /Catholic)
			4. Rudiansyah (Malay/Muslim)
PKPI			1. Ignatius Irawan (Dayak /Catholic)
			2. Syamsudin Soelaiman (Malay/Muslim)
PD			1. Effendy, MT (Malay/Muslim)
			2. Patrisius Yansen, SH (Dayak /Catholic)
PPD			Hasan, SH (Malay/Muslim)
Total	8 Malays (20, 5 %), 5 Muslims (12,8 %), 4 Batak (10,2%), 22 unknown background (56,4%)	28 Malays (70%), 10 Dayak (25 %), 1 Javanese, 1 Batak,	29 Malays (72,5%), 9 Dayak (22,5%), 1 Javanese, 1 Chinese

Note: Morkes Effendi from GOLKAR is now the Head of Ketapang District. **Blue color indicates Dayak origins.**

Source: Collected by Andri W.P from the Ketapang Election Committee Office.

There are several assumption made by local and outside observers based on their own observation. This information was acquired during our interview in 2000. The first assumption made by Alqadrie from the Tanjung Pura University, suggested that the role

of Habib, a Muslim leader who is considered the direct descendant of Prophet Mohammad, among the Madurese and the Malays in Ketapang was very strong so they could prevent violent conflict from happening.

The second assumption was made by Matua Sirait, an ICRAF researcher based in Bogor who had lived in Kalimantan for some time. He argued that the conflict between Dayak and Madurese in Ketapang might be prevented from breaking into violence by a strong influence of Dayak leaders, particularly those in the Dayakology who originally came from Ketapang. However, according to Kalimantan Review (No. 68, 2001, 13) in September 2000 in Manis Mata, Ketapang, there was a murder of a Dayak Jalai by several Dayak, which led to hundreds of Dayak attacking and killing a Madurese, who Manis Mata police had arrested. The riot did not spread out because the location is far into the interior.

If we agree with Matua Sirait's assumption of the Dayak, we should realize that the Dayak in Ketapang is not homogeneous. Firstly, according to the Institute of Dayakology's research (2004), within 11 out of 15 sub-districts of Ketapang, which is locally known as "Tanah Kayong", we could find 51 language groupings among 113,033 Dayak or 28.43% of the total population of Ketapang in 1998 (397,597 people), covering several sub-ethnic groups (28), namely: Simpakng, Gerai, Baya, Kancikng, Cempede', Mali, Laur, Joka', Domit, Bihak, Krio, Mentuka', Beginci, Tola', Tayap Ulu, Kayong, Gerunggang, Pesaguan, Kengkubang, Kendawangan, Lemandau, Jalai, Air Upas, Air Durian, Menggaling, Membulu, Belaban, Batu Payung, and Sekakai (Institut Dayakologi, 2004). The biggest ones are Simpakng, which consists of four language groups (a total of 25,410 people), Jalai, nine language groups (13,452), Pesaguan, seven language groups (9,544), Tayap Ulu, three language groups (3,062), and Kendawangan, Bihak, and Krio, which each consist of

two language groups, or 3,986, 2,092, and 3,662 respectively (Institut Dayakologi, 2004).

Secondly, we could not believe that the Dayak leaders in the Dayakology could have a far-reaching power over the whole Dayak community in Ketapang, particularly since the Dayak of Ketapang openly acknowledge Raja Hulu Aik VI-Raja Singa Bansa³⁷ as their local leader, who rules over several Dayak sub-ethnic groups within the territory of *Laman Sembilan Domong Sepuloh*, namely Dayak Krio from Sandai district, Dayak Simpang from Sungai Laur and Simpang Hulu, Dayak Pesaguan from Tumbang Titi, Dayak Kayong from Tanga Tayap, and Dayak Jelai from Jelai Hulu, as well as Dayak Bihak and Kendawangan.

The incredible power of Raja Singa Bansa over its people, perhaps, could be measured through the following incident, which was reported by Kalimantan Review (No. 36, 1998). Because Raja Hulu Aik VI-Raja Singa Bansa singlehandedly has ordered the procession of rituals of “*tolak bala*” on 11–15 August 1998, Dayak Customary Council (DADK) then issued a punishment which was seen as being very insulting by the customary communities of Ketapang. They, feeling insulted, refused to recognize the existence of DADK. These people considered:

- 1) DADK has eliminated the role of *demung*, *temenggung* as the real Dayak customary chiefs;
- 2) DADK does not represent the Dayak customary communities, but the government’s interest;

37 He was inaugurated as Raja Hulu Aik on June 25th 1997. His residential place is located in Sengkuang Sub-village, Menyumbung Village, Sandai District, which could be reached from Ketapang after around ten hours on speedboat along Pawan River. Sengkuang Sub-village is situated on the side of Krio River, and it is inhabited by about 350 people. Raja Singa Bansa was a Catholic with a Christian name “Petrus”, but after he was inaugurated, he and his wife have to “forget” Christian teachings.

- 3) DADK was not democratic because they were not elected by the *demung* or customary chiefs within the territory of *Laman Sembilan Domong Sepuluh*;
- 4) The term Customary Council is not known among the Dayak community. The Dayak only recognize the term *temenggung*, *domong adat*, and so on
- 5) Most DADK members do not understand Dayak customs and customary laws (Kalimantan Review, No. 36, 1998, 17).

Obviously, if we consider the powerful position of Raja Singa Bansa vis-à-vis DADK, it would be difficult to place the ‘far-reaching’ position and influence of Dayakology’s leaders in the realm of Ketapang’s local politics to prevent local violence.

If we consider the inequality issue that underlies the Dayak-Madurese or the Malay-Madurese clashes in Sanggau Ledo and Sambas, perhaps we should also investigate how the problem of inequality works for Ketapang. The land of Ketapang, which covers the area of 35,809 km², is considered as fertile, so about 60% of the Ketapang population, which according to Population Census of 2000, amounted to 419,771 people, is working in agricultural sector. The contribution of agricultural activities amounted to 27.19% or Rp382 billion (a tentative figure provided for 2001), with the highest contribution from forest products (estimated as high as 9%). Nevertheless, it was reported—particularly for logs—to have a considerable decrease (39%) every year since 1997, from 393,481 m³ in 1997 to 151,544.99 m³ in 2000. The reason is the widespread of illegal logging activities, such in The National Park Gunung Palung (TNGP) whose 90,000 ha was reduced to only 28,800 ha. That is why the local government decided to stop the permit for 100 ha concessions (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:404–405). Ketapang allocated 961,865 ha of oil palms in Manis Mata, Tumbang Titi, Marau, and Sungai Laur sub-districts. Still, only 138,429 ha has been

planted under the management of ten domestic companies and two foreign companies from Malaysia and England.

If we cross-tabulate sectors by ethnic group (see Table 6.4 below), we could see that in all sectors, Dayak and/or Dayak Pesaguan are the majority. The number of Madurese is larger than the Malays in most of the sectors, except for “other crops”, “fishery”, and “services”. Perhaps it is only in “livestock”, “other agriculture”, and “trade” that their (Madurese) numbers are much larger, more than double the Malay numbers. Even so, the number of Javanese is much larger than the Madurese (except in “livestock”), which makes the number of the Madurese relatively small. The Javanese are most dominant— second after the Dayak (including Dayak Pesaguan)— in “food crops” (7.8%), “other crops” (24,72%), and “services” (13,25%). It seems only in “livestock” that the Madurese are the most noticeable (34,48%), although their number is still smaller than Dayak Pesaguan (46,62%). The Chinese are the most apparent in “trade” (26,37%). In this sector, the Madurese occupy the fourth rank after the Dayak (including Dayak Pesaguan), the Chinese, and the Javanese. It seems that, like in Sanggau Ledo and Sambas, it is not the Madurese’s economic status that causes violence, or, in the Ketapang case, does not cause violence.

Table 6.4. Contingency Table of Sector by Ethnic Groups for Ketapang District

Count Total % Col % Row %	Others	Food crops	Other crops	Fishery	Livestock	Other Agr.	Manuf.	Trade	Services	Transport	
Bugis	267	1,236	286	249	16	208	149	143	233	58	2,845
	0.13	0.60	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.03	1.37
	1.05	1.52	0.97	3.54	1.02	1.13	1.34	1.18	1.25	2.06	
	9.38	43.44	10.05	8.75	0.56	7.31	5.24	5.03	8.19	2.04	

Count Total % Col % Row %	Others	Food crops	Other crops	Fishery	Livestock	Other Agr.	Manuf.	Trade	Services	Transport	
Chinese	788 0.38 3.11 11.98	626 0.30 0.77 9.52	290 0.14 0.99 4.41	234 0.11 3.33 3.56	18 0.01 1.15 0.27	252 0.12 1.37 3.83	453 0.22 4.06 6.89	3,200 1.54 26.37 48.67	597 0.29 3.21 9.08	117 0.06 4.16 1.78	6,575 3.17
Dayak	6,518 3.14 25.73 10.23	34,675 16.69 42.68 54.45	9,696 4.67 32.99 15.22	1,271 0.61 18.06 2.00	66 0.03 4.21 0.10	5,952 2.87 32.27 9.35	1,094 0.53 9.80 1.72	1,310 0.63 10.80 2.06	2,659 1.28 14.31 4.18	444 0.21 15.80 0.70	63,685 30.66
Dayak Mahap	6 0.00 0.02 7.50	25 0.01 0.03 31.25	12 0.01 0.04 15.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.00 0.06 1.25	7 0.00 0.04 8.75	8 0.00 0.07 10.00	2 0.00 0.02 2.50	18 0.01 0.10 22.50	1 0.00 0.04 1.25	80 0.04
Dayak Ngabang	1 0.00 0.00 11.11	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.00 0.01 11.11	7 0.00 0.04 77.78	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	9 0.00
Dayak Pesaguan	11,821 5.69 46.67 14.98	27,051 13.02 33.29 34.29	6,347 3.06 21.60 8.04	4,060 1.95 57.70 5.15	730 0.35 46.62 0.93	8,536 4.11 46.28 10.82	6,377 3.07 57.14 8.08	3,752 1.81 30.92 4.76	8,788 4.23 47.28 11.14	1,432 0.69 50.94 1.82	78,894 37.98
Dayak Suhaid	2 0.00 0.01 11.11	0 0.00 0.02 0.00	7 0.00 0.00 38.89	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	1 0.00 0.06 5.56	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 0.00 0.02 11.11	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	6 0.00 0.03 33.33	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	18 0.01
Javanese	2,130 1.03 8.41 9.58	6,335 3.05 7.80 28.49	7,264 3.50 24.72 32.66	138 0.07 1.96 0.62	109 0.05 6.96 0.49	1,053 0.51 5.71 4.73	1,060 0.51 9.50 4.77	1,440 0.69 11.87 6.48	2,462 1.19 13.25 11.07	248 0.12 8.82 1.12	22,239 10.71
Madu- rese	1,137 0.55 4.49 11.96	3,944 1.90 4.85 41.49	261 0.13 0.89 2.75	125 0.06 1.78 1.31	540 0.26 34.48 5.68	819 0.39 4.44 8.61	768 0.37 6.88 8.08	1,032 0.50 8.51 10.86	710 0.34 3.82 7.47	171 0.08 6.08 1.80	9,507 4.58
W. Kal Malay	1,043 0.50 4.12 12.90	3,121 1.50 3.84 38.59	693 0.33 2.36 8.57	381 0.18 5.41 4.71	30 0.01 1.92 0.37	330 0.16 1.79 4.08	657 0.32 5.89 8.12	348 0.17 2.87 4.30	1,411 0.68 7.59 17.45	74 0.04 2.63 0.91	8,088 3.89
Others	1,616 0.78 6.38 10.25	4,235 2.04 5.21 26.87	4,531 2.18 15.42 28.74	579 0.28 8.23 3.67	55 0.03 3.51 0.35	1,287 0.62 6.98 8.16	593 0.29 5.31 3.76	905 0.44 7.46 5.74	1,696 0.82 9.12 10.76	266 0.13 9.46 1.69	15,763 7.59
Total	25,329 12.19	81,248 39.12	29,387 14.15	7,037 3.39	1,566 0.75	18,444 8.88	11,161 5.37	12,133 5.84	18,587 8.95	2,811 1.35	207,703

Source: Acquired by Andri W.P. from the Ketapang District authority.

With its 2,600 km² extended areas of water³⁸, Ketapang expects to develop its fishery sector to replace the decreasing forestry sector, especially since it grew about 3.5% from 20,172 tonnes in 1999 to 25,520.2 tonnes in 2000. The growth of fishery sector does not mean that the lives of fishermen are getting better because inflation has caused the price of goods rise sharply. Also, 46.2% of them still use a boat without an engine. Their number also grew by about 9.79% from 8,745 in 1999 to 10,585 in 2000. Among 7,037 Ketapang fishermen (see Table 6.1), we could find several ethnic groups, the Dayak as the majority (about 20%), the Malay (5.41%), the Bugis (3.54%), the Chinese (3.3%), the Javanese (1.96%), as well as the Madurese, albeit in the smallest number (1.78%). While the forestry sector is intensely ruined by illegal logging, the fishery sector is full of conflicts between local fishermen and between local and foreign fishermen (Adhuri, 2002)—for example, in 2002 it was reported that Ketapang fishermen burnt eight trawl boats³⁹ However, it is not clear who is considered local and foreign. In this case, the ethnic factor did not enter the conflict.

38 For development purposes, the local government decides that there are four ‘strategic’ areas, that is Kendawangan as its main port, Manis Mata as the gate to Central, South and East Kalimantan, Balai Berkuak to open the door to eastern part of West Kalimantan up to Kendawangan port and Sarawak-Malaysia, and finally Telok Batang as the gate from Pontianak to Ketapang (Tim Litbang Kompas, 2003:406 & 408).

39 As reported by Kompas, 21 March 2002, the Sampit boat owners did not pay the fine of three million rupiah to fishermen from Sukabaru as a consequence of the fishing ground violation, so on March 2002 eight mini-trawl boats belonging to Sampit Village’s (Matan Hilir Utara Sub-district) fishermen was burnt by fishermen from Sukabaru Village, Matan Hilir Selatan Sub-district. Also see Adhuri (2002).

Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict Prevention: What is the Next Step?

The motivation of actors involved in conflict, whether economic, political, or cultural, is clearly at the heart of any conflict situation. Usually, those economic, political, and cultural motivations determine how people view themselves and others as they form the so-called our group vis-a-vis their group. It has been shown in many cases that political leaders set out to create group consciousness to achieve a basis for power. As Stewart (2002) has emphasized, “Differences in actual underlying conditions with respect to political control and economic conditions, facilitate the development of group identity and mobilization. Without any differences in these factors, group identification is likely to be weak and remain a cultural rather than political or conflict-creating phenomenon” (p. 10). Horizontal inequality is one of the ways to understand motives for group violence. This motivation must be clearly understood if a conflict is to be avoided or stopped. The causes of violent conflict are found in the interactions of power-seeking with group identity and inequalities. Nevertheless, the question of how groups are formed is

quite complex and is not part of our topic of discussion in this book. Our present concern is the issue of horizontal inequalities itself.

From our discussion in the previous chapters, inequality has indeed played a role in the conflict and violence in West Kalimantan. Still, it is not a simple calculation of various statistical measurements. It is not a large number of (Madurese) transmigrants per se that created jealousy and violence, nor is there a clear economic and political competition between groups that led to anger and violent attacks. Instead, we could find a combination of historical, economic, political, and cultural factors that have produced “ethnicized” perceptions and expectations developed within a particular temporal and spatial context. We could blame “outside” influences (i.e., through development policy)—like some had done—for creating structural violence. Still, the locals have taken an initiative in mobilizing conflicts as “part of a wider struggle for political justice.” The result that clearly shows the ethnic divisions of power—*pemekaran*—speaks volumes about the role played by the “leaders” of each group in emphasizing ethnic differences for their political purposes. Obviously, the role of the “leaders” is very crucial because, as the case of Ketapang has shown, without such “enterprising” leaders, ethnic differences did not produce violence.

Based on its saliency, violent conflict between ethnic groups in West Kalimantan might be classified into Tadjoeeddin and Murshed’s “episodic violence”, because it involved a relatively low number of incidents but a high number of deaths, in contrast to the routine one such as group brawls and vigilante violence which is characterized by a high number of incidents but minimal deaths. SMERU’s paper written by Yumma and Suryahadi (2015) reported that, “Between 1990 and 2003 ethno-communal violence accounted for 89.3% (or 9,612 casualties)..., yet this contributed only 16.6 % of incidents, while ... [routine violence] accounted for 10.7 % of deaths but 83.4 % of total incidents.” Moreover, this inter-ethnic (and religious)

violence, as SMERU has noted, was concentrated in a few regions in the outer islands; beside in Sanggauledo and Sambas in West Kalimantan as discussed in this book, it also rampaged Sampit in Central Kalimantan, Maluku, and Poso in Central Sulawesi. SMERU also contributed the surge in this episodic (ethnic) violence, together with separatist violence in Aceh and Papua, as the marking of Indonesia's transition to democracy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, because their recent study that focused on the period of 2005–2012 for 14 regions which were previously considered as “high conflict”⁴⁰ found that “the racket of episodic violence ...had been more or less settled”, and “there is a clear shift in the type of collective violence in contemporary [or post democratic transition] Indonesia... there tended to be more routine violence (both in terms of number of incidents and deaths)” (Yumma & Suryahadi, 2015). However, the shifting of conflict type from episodic to routine does not change the fact that inequality and ethnicity still play a significant role in “routine violence.” As SMERU's study⁴¹ indicated,

“The characteristics of post-2004 ethnic violence are closer to ‘routine’ violence.... The study has found that both horizontal and vertical inequality are closely linked to ethnic violence. Nonetheless, the predictive power of horizontal inequality

40 Those regions were Aceh, Lampung, Jakarta, some districts/municipalities in West Java (namely Bogor, Depok, and Bekasi), Banten (Tangerang), West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua.

41 It should be noted that SMERU's research which combined data from Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS)¹ with other socioeconomic datasets was aimed “to examine the possible effect of vertical inequality (among households and individuals) and horizontal inequality (across ethnic groups or regions) on societal stability, in democratic and decentralized Indonesia” in post 2004...Based on the study, SMERU concluded that “different forms of inequality may affect different types of collective violence in varying ways”. Thus, since “rising inequality is harmful for societal stability”, they argued that unpacking inequality and categorizing violence is critical for governments to appropriately address these issues” (Yumma & Suryahadi, 2015).

is much stronger than vertical inequality's. It means that the impact of inequality on ethnic violence is more noticeable if we use the inequality variable between ethnic or religious groups rather than inequality between individuals or households" (Yumma & Suryahadi, 2015).

Tajoeddin, et al. (2015) clarified that the inequality variable "appears to be more significant and consistent as a determinant of collective violence compared with a series of variables representing the opportunity for violence hypothesis", contending that "tackling inequality [should be] included as an explicit focus in development agenda" (p. 20). Unfortunately, it is not clear what they mean by development agenda, because as we all know "*pemerataan pembangunan*" (equitable development) has been a development slogan since Soeharto's New Order till today, but so far we find a wider socio-economic gap between individuals and communities, which was reflected by respective protests toward the government from time to time.

From a different perspective, we could refer to Rachael Diprose's study on Central Sulawesi that found the importance of decentralization impact on conflict dynamics at the local level. According to her, its two-fold impact is 1) "[addressing] long-standing intergroup tensions and horizontal inequalities... particularly where geographically concentrated ethno-religious groups have previously been marginalised from government", as well as "[reducing] grievances by increasing local autonomy and participation in decision making through direct elections of district head, now a hotly contested arena of local politics"; and 2) "[stimulating] changes in population demographics in some areas in Indonesia resulting in ethno-religious segregation through splitting of sub-national administrative units into increasing numbers of regions...[so that].. [g]roups with previous minority status have found safe-haven as majorities, setting the scene for how future

rights of access and representation play out... [Consequently,] [t]ensions run high when high-stakes local elections are contested along sensitive identity lines, or when district governments are not inclusive of minorities in their regions” (Diprose, 2009). Diprose’s illustration of “groups with previously minority status have found safe-haven as majorities” fits nicely with the post-conflict situation in West Kalimantan, particularly in the split of Sambas into Bengkayang. Similarly, high tensions will always be found in local elections when district governments are not inclusive of minorities in their regions.

Under the circumstances, it is clear that we must put a conflict resolution mechanism in place at the national level, particularly to deal with ethnic (religious) based economic and political conflicts that occur in ethnically and religiously diverse outer Java rather than in Java. Of course, this is not to say that conflict issues in Java are less complex than outside Java, but certainly, those two areas have different characteristics of conflict to deal with.

Regarding the post-conflict situation in West Kalimantan, several issues should be explained. First, the impact of Sanggau Ledo and Sambas conflicts on the conflicting groups, particularly the Madurese, was quite severe, because the Madurese were not only losing their homes, but also being ‘prevented to return to Sambas’ long after the situation has returned to normal (Emita et al., 2024). In that case, Madurese’s left-behind personal and family assets such as house, land, etc. were difficult, if not impossible, to be handled for the benefit of its original owners. Most of the Madurese refugees stayed in Pontianak in temporary shelters, and later starting a new life there.

Second, although the local government has provided a relocation area for them in Tebang Kacang and Parit Asam Villages, not all Madurese refugees were able to have a better life in the new places.

This is particularly due to the uncertainty of job availability for those who work in non-agricultural sectors (Bestari et al., 2022). Some of them chose to work outside their relocated village to Pontianak, Ketapang or even Malaysia (Adzim et al., 2022, p. 2766).

Third, issue of trauma management and reconciliation has mostly been ignored by local authorities who considered that conflict has been settled down once the refugees have been relocated. Nevertheless, the relationship between Sambas Malay with the Madurese refugees continues to be ‘unintegrated’ until today because they both hold on to the traumatic experience of the past (Nova, et al., 2023; Ulum, 2013). Therefore, it might imply that relocation has obstructed reconciliation.

Fourth, we also see changes in the post-conflict population data in the villages where the conflict was first started after the Madurese were out of the picture. For example, in Pemangkat it recorded the decrease of 10,982 people between the population of 1998 (94,769 people) and that of 1999 (83,787 people), even though it could not be said for sure that those 10,982 people were all Madurese (Bestari et al., 2022, p. 142). All these issues should be highly recognized while we are searching a ‘conflict management model’ that is most appropriate for Indonesia’s diverse population.

List of Abbreviations

APJKB	=	<i>Asosiasi Pedagang Jeruk Kalimantan Barat</i> (Jeruk Traders Association of West Kalimantan)
ASPjer	=	<i>Asosiasi Pedagang Jeruk Siam Jakarta</i> (Jeruk Siam Traders Association of Jakarta)
DPRD	=	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (Regional People's Representative Assembly)
FKPM	=	<i>Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu</i> (Communication Forum for Malays Youngsters)
Golkar	=	<i>Partai Golongan Karya</i> (The Party of Functional Groups)
HPH	=	<i>Hak Pengusahaan Hutan</i> (Forest Logging Concession)
HTI	=	<i>Hutan Tanaman Industri</i> (Industrial Plantation Forest)
PGRS/ PARAKU	=	<i>Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak/Partai Komunis</i> <i>Kalimantan Utara</i> (Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force/North Kalimantan Communist Party)
PAN	=	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party)
Parpol	=	<i>Partai politik</i> (political party)
PBB	=	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> (Crescent Star Party)
PBR	=	<i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Reform Star Party)

PBSD	= <i>Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat</i> (Social Democrat Labour Party)
PD	= <i>Partai Demokrat</i> (Democratic Party)
PDS	= Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party)
PDIP	= <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PILKADA	= <i>Pemilihan kepala daerah</i> (regional elections)
PIR	= <i>Perkebunan karet Inti Rakyat</i> (contract farming in rubber plantation)
PKPI	= <i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)
PKS	= <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party)
PNBK	= <i>Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party)
PPP	= <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
PPD	= <i>Partai Persatuan Daerah</i> (???)
PPDK	= <i>Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i> ; now PDK = <i>Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i> (Democratic Nationhood Party)
PT CP	= PT Ceria Prima
PT MISP	= PT Mitra Inti Sejahtera Plantation
PT RWK	= PT Rana Wastu Kencana
SKT	= <i>Surat Keterangan Tanah</i> (land statement)
SPT	= <i>Surat Pernyataan Tanah</i> (land statement)
Susenas	= Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (Indonesian Socio-Economic Monitoring Survey)
TKI	= <i>Tenaga Kerja Indonesia</i> (immigrant workers)

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The 1996/1997 Conflict in West Kalimantan: A Historical Recollection provides a critical examination of the tragic communal violence between the Dayak, Malay, and Madurese communities during the end of Indonesia's New Order regime. Utilizing Frances Stewart's framework of horizontal inequalities, this book investigates the socio-economic, political, and cultural dimensions underlying the bloodshed. This book also challenges prevailing cultural explanations by highlighting systemic issues, including transmigration policies, natural resource exploitation, and the marginalizing effects of local political restructuring.

By presenting empirical data, this book offers profound insights into the complex interactions between ethnic identity and state policy. This book can be considered as an essential resource for researchers and students interested in conflict studies, horizontal inequalities, and the political history of West Kalimantan.

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