Chapter 2

Indonesia's Contributive Role in the G20 to Mitigate the COVID-19 Pandemic

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A. Intergovernmental Organizations in the Contemporary Era

Globalization has induced transboundary problems around the world. These problems, such as climate change issues, terrorism, poverty, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and the spread of diseases, should be addressed multilaterally. Hence, after the end of the Second World War, many countries in various parts of the world are eager to join or form Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO),[1] both regionally and globally. IGOs have become one of the important actors in international relations afterward. In 2009, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, encouraged all countries and society

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[1] Authors use the terms of IGOs, multilateral cooperation, and multilateral forums interchangeably.

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to collaborate to formulate long-term solutions to the global issues through Intergovernmental Organizations (Johnson, 2020).

Nevertheless, the legitimacy of IGOs has been challenged for decades to date. In 1999 a well-known event occurred when approximately 600,000 people held a demonstration against the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle (Machida, 2009). Last year, thousands of citizens across the globe assembled in their respective countries to urge the world leaders to take immediate actions in combating climate change during the Conference of the Parties (COP) 26 summit. This worldwide march illustrated the disappointment of the world community over the slow handling of global warming under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Kottasová & Picheta, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic that emerged at the end of 2019 has become a further challenge for global governance. As a result, enormous countries have implemented lockdowns, closed their borders, and are occupied with crises within their respective countries. Indeed, this situation may encourage governments to be apathetic about global issues. Furthermore, public distrust of the global COVID-19 governance led by the World Health Organization (WHO)—such as the rejection of lockdown and vaccination—has further jeopardized the trend of multilateral cooperation that has been built over the last few decades. Considering this phenomenon, Intergovernmental Organizations are increasingly required to be a forum for discussion and provide solutions for their member countries.

One of the Intergovernmental Organizations vital in mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic is the Group of Twenty (G20). G20 was established in 1999, encompassing the nineteenth world's largest economies and the European Union. This multilateral cooperation was formed to be a forum for discussion related to the global economy and financial issues and policies. The G20 successfully overcame the Asian and global financial crises in 1998 and 2008. Therefore, the organization is expected to lead global recovery programs after the crisis generated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Indonesia is one of the founding members of the G20. The country has contributed significantly to various programs run by the G20 after that. Currently, Indonesia is assigned to hold the G20 presidency for the first time. This chapter will analyze the contribution of the G20 to COVID-19 mitigation and its transformation to adapt to the changing world caused by the pandemic. Furthermore, this chapter will also elaborate on Indonesia's role, as a member, in the G20 transformation.

Thus, this chapter addresses how COVID-19 affects the identity of the G20. According to Peter Katzenstein, identity refers to '*the images of individuality and distinctiveness ("selfhood") held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant others*' (Jepperson et al., 1996). Moreover, this chapter also discusses how Indonesia, as a member of the G20, contributes to shaping the identity of the G20 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The authors answer these questions using a qualitative analysis approach with the case study method. Furthermore, this chapter also explores the transformations of G20 to adapt to the changing world conditions due to COVID-19 and how the Indonesian government participates in this transformation using Constructivist Theory. This study uses secondary sources, such as books, article journals, reports, news, government documents, and websites to collect the necessary data.

B. The Importance of Normative Structure in Inter-governmental Organizations

While the benefits and role of Intergovernmental Organizations in managing various global issues have been widely discussed, studies related to the normative structure adopted by the institution are often overlooked. According to Ruggie (1992), multilateralism has characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of cooperation. He further defines multilateralism as an institution where three or more states coordinate their action and relation based on general principles

regardless of their respective national interests. Additionally, Keohane describes the institution as 'persistent and connected sets of formal and informal rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constraint activity, and shape expectations' (Ruggie, 1992). Accordingly, the principle embraced by the multilateral institution serves as values that determine what is desirable and how the countries should behave across the situation (Beattie, 2019; Zelicovich, 2021).

The normative structure has been confirmed to influence the country's foreign policy. However, the programs and policies of Intergovernmental Organizations are rarely associated with the topic of values and norms. Indeed, political or economic power distribution is insufficient to explain why multilateral cooperation is formed and how to maintain it (Zelicovich, 2021). For instance, the United Nations was established based on several principles such as maintaining world peace and stability, sovereign equality of all its members, and equal rights and self-determination (United Nations, 2021). These principles work as guidelines for the United Nations and its bodies in determining the various programs to be implemented, such as human rights, gender equality, humanitarian aid, sustainable development, peacekeeping operations, and international law preservation.

On many occasions, an Intergovernmental Organization is conceived as a norm agency. The member countries are obliged to behave based on shared principles and follow the rules set by the institution (Grigorescu, 2002). However, a study by Finnemore found that the implementation of science policy bureaucracies by states around the globe was not catalyzed by internal demand. Instead, UNESCO encouraged all states to bear the responsibility for science (Finnemore, 1993). She further argues that the state's responsibility for science was developed within the organization since its inception (Park, 2006).

Furthermore, values and norms are crucial to maintaining the effectiveness and legitimacy of multilateral cooperation (Maull, 2020). The definition of legitimacy based on a normative sense means that the intergovernmental organization will be considered legitimate if it implements its authority based on equality, human rights, transparency,

accountability, and democracy (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Likewise, Barnett and Finnemore explain that the public organization may acquire legitimacy procedurally and substantively (Satoshi, 2009). The latter highlights the institution's ability to achieve its objectives under the community's values. Several international economic organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), were denounced by thousands of people in 1999 due to their failure to perform democratic values (Satoshi, 2009). In another case, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was also criticized as illegitimate. The organization has been dominated by five major countries with veto power, leading to an asymmetric position among member countries, particularly during the decision-making process (Frederking & Patane, 2017).

Another important non-material structure in establishing a solid intergovernmental organization is identity. Aside from confidence and shared interest, some scholars argue that collective identity is crucial for forming multilateral cooperation or international organization (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). For example, the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Cold War era has ended. It is assumed due to the collective identity of its member countries as democratic countries. Even the organization enlarged its membership to spread democratic values (Sjursen, 2004). In a nutshell, normative structures such as values, norms, principles, and identity play a pivotal role in shaping, directing, and preserving the multilateral organization.

C. Constructivism and Intergovernmental Organizations Nexus

Constructivism Theory—which emerged during the end of the Cold War—has drawn the attention of international relations discourse to a new perspective. However, since the beginning, international relations have been dominated by materialistic thoughts such as realism and liberalism, which claim that states will statically struggle for power in an anarchy system and should cooperate to minimize conflicts.

Accordingly, these major theories have contrasting ideas on peaceful international politics. On the one hand, realism assumes that peace is unlikely to be achieved in a world full of conflicts and competition. Nevertheless, on the other hand, liberalism highlights the possibility of cooperation mechanisms to create perpetual peace (Viotti, 2013).

However, Constructivism—derived from sociological insights—stresses the importance of non-material structures. This approach argues that the international system and national interests are constructed by the beliefs, norms, and identities of states, as stated by Alexander Wendt that "anarchy is what state makes of it" and "identities are the basis of interests" (Burchill et al., 2005). Wendt emphasizes the dynamic of the international environment and actors' identities which are created, developed, sustained, or transformed during interaction among actors (Zehfuss, 2009). Christian Reus-Smith further explained that a state's decisions are intervened by human values—such as peace, understanding, freedom, justice, respect, and dignity—which ultimately shape world politics (Griffiths, 2009). Concisely, international politics and states' interests and decisions are subject to change following the alteration of states' values, norms, beliefs, and identities.

Similarly, the Constructivist approach contributes to the study of Intergovernmental Organizations. Based on the elaboration above on Constructivism, this study will explore how COVID-19 affects identity and the policies of the G20 to adapt to the current world's situation. Furthermore, this chapter investigates the Indonesian role as a member of the G20 transformations. Barnett and Finnemore describe institutional reform as an event that involves 'transformation in ideologies, norms, and appropriate standards of behavior' within the institution (Nielson, 2006). According to Constructivist scholars, a normative structure can catalyze an institution's transformation. Colin Hay argues that institutional change may occur when a new idea emerges, which causes the institution to be unable to function if the changes do not adapt to the novelty (Eleveld, 2016). Transitions experienced by Intergovernmental Organizations can also be induced

by endogenous factors or exogenous shocks or crises; as stated by Peter Katzenstein that the environment might affect actors' properties, namely identity, interests, and capabilities (Jepperson et al., 1996). In this case, COVID-19 is an exogenous factor likely to drive the transformation of G20 identity and policies.

D. The G20 Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

For over 20 years, since 1999, G20 has been working on a discussion of economic policies to achieve international financial stability (Modak, 2021). These discussions aim to solve the financial crisis by involving several member countries, including Indonesia. The G20 first met in November 2008 to discuss the financial crisis in the US (Byrd, 2021). These meetings continue to be held every year to pay attention to policies that can control and overcome financial crises on a global scale.

At the end of 2019, the world faced a new challenge: the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has impacted various sectors, including the stability of the world economy. According to International Labor Organization (ILO, 2020), the pandemic is estimated to have wiped out the equivalent of around 305 million jobs globally in the second quarter of 2020. This resulted in increased unemployment, drastic fluctuations in currency, commodity, and financial markets, and negative impacts on key economic sectors such as the service industry, exports, hospitality and tourism, aviation, retail, construction, and education. These phenomena contributed significantly to causing a worse economic crisis than any financial problems ever (Luckhurst et al., 2020a). Therefore, the G20 is uniquely positioned to assist in managing complex policy challenges and instituting multilateral preparedness and domestic, regional, and global resilience-building measures. Consequently, G20 should take various action plans and policies that can effectively maintain the stability of the world economy (Luckhurst et al., 2020b).

Global leadership and coordinated strategic decision-making and policy-making are urgently needed in response to the challenges and

consequences of COVID-19. The response aims at the complexity and preparedness of the world facing similar problems in the future, such as building institutional resilience and strengthening economic, social, health, and environmental stability. The G20 has become an influential committee in overcoming global financial crises, such as those experienced in 2008–2009 (Cooper & Thakur, 2013). The G20 can respond to the COVID-19 challenges by managing multifaceted difficulties, especially in coordination with the IMF and multilateral development banks. Moreover, the priority of cooperation based on health, economic, and financial consequences is one of the important components of the G20 Action Plan (G20, 2020).

Coherence, effectiveness, and speed of governance arrangements and policy-making steps respond to the global pandemic. However, the gaps in developing governance and these steps must address the multilevel effects of COVID-19 in national, regional, or international contexts. Some of the impacts caused by the global pandemic include a decline in trade, currency and financial market volatility, logistical distribution problems (medical supplies, food, and others), increased unemployment due to job losses, global recessionary pressures, and other indications of world economic instability. The country's unpreparedness exacerbates its difficulty in facing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, several demographic groups are vulnerable to being disadvantaged, such as the elderly, the poor, specific ethnicities, to the gender aspect (WHO, 2020).

In addition, the global health agenda established by governance should be a top priority in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and recovering the global economy. The commitment to the worldwide health agenda can be seen through the commitment and support from the leaders of the G20 summit. For instance, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, as a General Director of WHO, called upon the leader of G20 to commit and support for vaccination program to reach 40% of the population who are vaccinated by the late 2021 and 70% by the midterm of 2022 (WHO, 2021). Furthermore, there are four crucial things to produce better global health governance: an international

instrument that can strengthen global health cooperation, enhance the global pandemic preparedness, and increase the solidarity among nations; a more and better financial preparedness and responses for the national or international health governance; utilization of existing financial institutions for better outcomes and avoiding the fragment of the global health architecture; and full awareness of the sustainability financed to conduct the mandate of the organization (Modak, 2021).

Furthermore, the pandemic has placed a scenario of a country's security on its global health security. Global health governance is a new scheme that should be considered in responding to a pandemic by placing preparedness on broader health security. The crisis of COVID-19 has prompted the G20 to implement a global health defense by implementing global health governance and policies, including equitable access to healthcare systems and medicines, vaccine distribution, universal health coverage, capacity-building programs, training of medical professionals, and funding.

In contrast to the summit in 2019 in Osaka, which only dedicated 14% of its documents to health, the Summit in Riyadh in 2020 had placed 68% (half of the communication) of its discussions on the health aspect (Byrd, 2021). Moreover, in 2021, the Summit in Rome, Italy, also puts health as one of the priorities discussed. Then the G20 Summit in Indonesia places global health governance as a priority issue (G20, 2022a).

Global health governance uses a multilevel governance approach. A multilevel governance approach is an approach that informs and coordinates policy-making responses at multilevel stages: global, trans-regional, regional, national, and sub-state (Knight & Persaud, 2008). This means that global health governance must inform and coordinate policy-making responses and contingency planning at the multilevel level with broad and in-depth discussions on aspects of global health security by utilizing the principle of subsidiarity. In addition, the global health governance framework requires global resilience and preparedness coordinated by the G20 by involving various institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), IMF, United

Nations (UN), World Bank, WHO, and other institutions. The aim is to test the resilience of an institution in responding to a pandemic of policy readiness to the mainstream in various governance settings. Moreover, this approach aims to address multiple vulnerabilities, especially in the health aspect, particularly in low- and middle-income states, and to achieve transverse synergies across various fields and institutional contexts (Knight, 2019).

E. Indonesia's Contribution to G20 Presidency

Indonesia has joined the G20 since 1999 in the Minister of Finance level formation. The activeness of Indonesia's participation can be seen through Indonesia's contribution and role to the G20, such as being co-chair of several working groups and the G20 task force. In addition, several records of Indonesia's contribution and position in the G20 can be seen significantly, such as the proposed security strategy for the financial sector, banking, and real sector defense at the Washington G20 Summit in 2008, the proposal for the establishment of a Global Expenditure Support Fund and global financial system reforms in overcoming the crisis at the G20 London Summit in 2009, the proposed development agenda as a priority issue of the G20 at Seoul Summit in 2010, as well as the proposed strategy for overcoming debt and fiscal exemption experienced by developing countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic at the G20 Saudi Arabia Summit in 2020, and the proposed strategy for the gap capacity among countries in accelerating responses and advocating for vaccine access and achieving Sustainable Development Goals at the G20 Italy Summit in 2021 (Hermawan, 2021).

In addition, Indonesia supports the financial sector at the G20 Presidency in Rome, Italy, through four things (G20, 2021). First, global support to countries vulnerable to the pandemic's impact through allocating special drawing rights, development bank financing facilities, and a debt reconstruction agenda (Kemenkeu, 2021). Second, support for infrastructure investment, digital infrastructure transformation, and private investment accelerate and enhance post-

pandemic infrastructure development (Kemenkeu, 2021). Third, support for sustainable finance and financing and carbon pricing to accelerate the recovery of the world economy that is environmentally friendly and sustainable. Fourth, support for strengthening and developing regulations through digital-based financial innovation (Kemenkeu, 2021).

On November 1, 2021, Indonesia was officially elected as the G20 Presidency for 2022. Inheriting the presidency from Italy, Indonesia is committed to realizing inclusive and sustainable growth under the proposed theme 'Recover Together, Recover Stronger' (G20, 2021a). In its implementation, the G20 presidency in Indonesia will focus on three main issues: global health architecture, digital transformation, and sustainable energy transition (G20, 2022b). The issue of global health architecture is coordinated with The Ministry of Health. Meanwhile, the digital transformation issue is under the coordination of The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, while the issue of the sustainable energy transition is under The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Indonesia prioritizes health issues as the central issue in realizing economic recovery. The priority of this health issue is a parallel response to the impact caused by COVID-19.

First is the issue of global health architecture. The problem found in this issue is the financing gap for Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (PPR) (G20, 2022a). Consequently, Indonesia hopes that the G20 Joint Finance and Health Task Force (JFHTF) will be able to discuss modalities for developing an inclusive G20-based financing facility planning while emphasizing the critical role of the WHO (G20, 2021b). Three priority sub-agendas exist to achieve a more robust global health architecture: building global health system resilience, aligning global health protocol standards, and developing a global manufacturing and knowledge center for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (Rokom, 2021).

Indonesia develops a strategy to achieve the objectives of each sub-agenda. First, Indonesia cooperates with WHO and the World Bank in realizing the development of a global health system defense by

setting up a Global Health Fund mechanism (G20, 2022a). Indonesia also cooperates with various international companies and expands access to vaccines, medicines, and the prevention of future health crises. Second, Indonesia encourages the alignment of mechanisms and systems of global health protocol standards so that each country can comply with the global protocol standards that have been set (G20, 2022a). Finally, Indonesia encourages global manufacturing and knowledge centers for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (G20, 2022a). Indonesia emphasizes that the unequal distribution of knowledge, mitigation, competence, and response to the pandemic is the source of the worsening crisis; thus, it must be equal. This inequality can have implications for the worst impact of the problem, so redistribution of the manufacture of knowledge centers is compulsory.

Second is the issue of digital transformation. Disruption of digital technology, including digital gaps such as access to connectivity, people's digital skills and literacy, and the use of cross-border data, are the problems found on this issue (Permadi, 2021). On the other hand, digital technology advances have accelerated growth and development in various sectors during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, Indonesia will lead the first Digital Economy Working Group in the G20 presidency in 2022. The Digital Economic Working Group (DEWG) can be a more comprehensive platform for discussing cross-sectoral digital issues under the G20. Thus, this priority issue aims to pursue a new cooperation landscape among nations to build a secure common in the digital age (G20, 2022c).

This issue has three main priorities: recovery and connectivity after the COVID-19 pandemic, digital skills and digital literacy, cross-border data flow, and free data flow with trust (Permadi, 2021). Consequently, prospective solutions to address the global and cross-cutting digital economy challenges in various countries are expected to result from the DEWG. Hence, Indonesia believes that DEWG can also accelerate Indonesia's Digital Transformation Agenda and strengthen collaboration between countries in supporting an equitable

and sustainable digital-based transformation for global recovery (Permadi, 2021). Indonesia's opportunity for the G20 presidency in 2022 is also well utilized, especially on the issue of digital transformation. Indonesia will present the Digital Transformation Expo through the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo, 2022). The exhibition aims to summarize the digital transformation journey in Indonesia in various sectors, such as trade, e-commerce, financial technology, digital education pioneers (edu-tech) to health (health-tech). Ministry of Communication and Information Technology plans to use metaverse technology in presenting the Digital Transformation Expo (Kominfo, 2022).

Lastly, sustainable energy transition. Indonesia holds the Energy Transition Forum in the Energy Transitions Working Group (ETWG) format to achieve a sustainable energy transition (VOI, 2022). The ETWG has three main priorities: access, technology, and funding. These three priorities are expected to reach a common agreement in the global energy transition and strengthen a sustainable global energy system and a just transition. In addition, Indonesia supports an inclusive global economic recovery policy through the world's collective efforts toward a global energy transition. G20 member countries have utilized 75% of global energy. Thus, they are responsible for using sustainable clean energy (Pribadi, 2022).

Furthermore, the ETWG also focuses on several topics such as energy security, access and efficiency, and the transition to a carbon energy system, including investment and innovation in cleaner and more efficient technologies (Pribadi, 2022). Indonesia is committed to realizing a sustainable energy transition by setting an energy mix target of 23 New and Renewable Energy (Energi Baru dan Terbarukan/ EBT) by 2025, fulfilling Net Zero Emissions (NZE) by 2060, reducing and eliminating the use of Steam Power Plants (PLTU), implementing a carbon tax with a tariff of IDR 30 per kilogram CO_2e on April 1, 2022, and Carbon Capture Usage and Storage (CCUS) to reduce carbon emissions while increasing oil and gas production, routine flaring, optimizing the application of natural gas for households and

transportation, and reducing methane emissions (Pribadi, 2022). These efforts are expected to be able to realize a sustainable energy transition.

F. COVID-19, the G20 Identity, and the Role of Indonesia: Leading Global Health Actor

Based on the elucidation mentioned above, the authors found that COVID-19 has become an external factor that transformed the G20 as a global health actor through various health policies that the G20 has taken during the pandemic. This transformation is indispensable for the G20 to adapt to the current situation. As a prestigious international forum covering countries with the largest economies in the world, the G20 is certainly expected by the international community to take a significant role in helping other countries, especially underdeveloped ones, mitigate the outbreak of COVID-19. Although initially the G20 was formed as a forum for economic cooperation between member countries, the development of issues occurring in the world has become a factor that transformed the identity of the G20, one of which is the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the G20 had already pursued the universal health coverage principle[2] and improved the health system. This effort was induced by the G20's recognition of health issues as an essential sector to achieve sustainable development goals. In 2019 when Japan chaired the G20, this institution held a G20 Okayama Health Ministers' Meeting. It declared the urgency to improve health issues such as population aging, digital health, health worker advancement, antimicrobial resistance, and polio eradication (The G20, 2019). However, the outbreak of COVID-19 has further encouraged the G20 to strengthen its identity as one of the important actors in global health governance.

The process of bolstering this identity has been happening gradually since 2020. Under the presidency of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2020, the G20 focused on three primary goals: empowering people,

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[2]   Universal Health Coverage is a principle which is promoted by the WHO that everyone can enjoy the health service regardless of how their financial condition.

safeguarding the planet, and shaping a new frontier. Concerning empowering people, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with other G20 leaders, has included enabling person-centered health system agenda (The Government of Saudi Arabia, 2019). Moreover, during the 2020 Riyadh Summit, the G20 incorporated strengthening health care systems, pandemic preparedness, and emerging threats to health, among other topics discussed in the meeting (The Government of Saudi Arabia, 2020).

Italian leadership in 2021 was not much different from Saudi Arabia. There were three visions during Italy's presidency: people-centered policy, planet resilience, and global prosperity (The Government of Italy, 2021). Nevertheless, on 21 May 2021, Italy—as the G20 president—and the European Commission held a Global Health Summit. During this meeting, the leaders of the G20 declared their support for boosting equal and affordable access to COVID-19 tools and vaccine distribution systems (G20, 2021b). Indeed, this summit demonstrated the increasing commitment of the G20 to contribute to global health management.

Finally, under the leadership of Indonesia, G20 explicitly mentions the health sector as one of its main agendas. The Indonesian government has proposed three priority issues implemented during its tenure in 2022: global health architecture, digital transformation, and sustainable energy transition. By strengthening the global health architecture, the G20 will significantly contribute to forming a more robust and equal global health system to deal with other pandemics in the future. In addition, the priority issue in the health sector advocated by the Indonesian Government is further shaping the identity of the G20 as a global health actor.

Table 2.1 G20 Policies Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic 2019–2022

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic	During the COVID-19 pandemic		
2019 (Japan)	2020 (Saudi Arabia)	2021 (Italy)	2022 (Indonesia)
The G20 generally declared the urgency to improve health issues such as population aging, digital health, health worker advancement, antimicrobial resistance, and polio eradication.	1. The G20 only slightly mentioned the person-centered health system agenda. 2. Discussed strengthening health care systems, pandemic preparedness, and emerging threats to health during the Riyadh Summit 2020.	The G20 declared their support for boosting equal and affordable access to COVID-19 tools and vaccine distribution systems during the Global Health Summit.	The G20 explicitly mentions the health sector as one of its main agendas, namely the Global Health Architecture agenda, introduced by Indonesia.

Table 2.1 shows that the G20 gradually involves the health agenda as its primary target and Indonesia's contribution in introducing the Global Health Architecture agenda. Here, the G20 member countries can play a vital role in establishing the fair distribution of COVID-19 tools, particularly vaccines. This is mainly due to several G20 member countries that are vaccine producers, such as the United States, Britain, Germany, Russia, China, and India. The G20 member countries also possess a high GDP rate compared to other nations, making them capable of ordering a massive amount of COVID-19 vaccine. According to a report by UNICEF, G20 member countries have received 15 times more vaccines per capita than low-income countries (UNICEF, 2021a). Hence, various parties encourage the G20 leaders to donate vaccines and other COVID-19 tools to developing countries, especially in Africa. In May 2021, countries in the region had only received approximately 1% of the 1.3 billion doses of global vaccine (Beaumont, 2021).

The G20—through the Global Health Summit—has pledged to encourage the equal distribution of vaccines to underdeveloped and low-income countries. However, the G20 has not established a particular scheme. Instead, its member countries have collaborated with the Covax Facility to implement this declaration. In addition, several member countries provide assistance and donations individually through bilateral cooperation or other organizations and programs such as UNICEF, Coalition Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Unitaid, GAVI Alliance, and WHO Global Funds (WHO, 2021a). For example, Germany donated 844,800 doses of the Astra Zeneca vaccine to the Philippines through the Covax Facility in October 2021 (WHO, 2021b). In November 2021, Canada also presented Covax Facility 1.9 million doses of Moderna to Uganda (UNICEF, 2021b). The contribution of the G20 countries in mitigating Covid-19 can be seen in Figure 2.1 which shows the United States and Germany are the member countries that provide the higher amount of donations compared to other members. However, as depicted in Figure 2.2, vaccines have the highest funding allocation from the G20 member countries. Thus, they have become the most donated COVID-19 tools for underdeveloped and developing countries.

It is noteworthy that this data was obtained from the Accelerator Commitment Tracker (ACT) by WHO; therefore, it is not impossible that G20 member countries also sent the COVID-19 tools and funding through other mechanisms such as bilateral cooperation and thus not recorded by WHO. For instance, considering its role as a major vaccine producer, the Indian government established a Vaccine Maitri Initiative campaign to supply the COVID-19 vaccine worldwide, including in low-income countries (Sharun, 2021). To implement this program, India provided a million vaccine doses to the Myanmar Red Cross Society in December 2021 and sent vaccines to Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal (Bhattacherjee, 2021).

Figure 2.1 Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) Funding Among G20 Member Countries 2020–2021

Figure 2.2 Allocation of Funding from G20 Member Countries by ACT-A Pillars

Unfortunately, despite tireless efforts by world leaders, vaccination gaps remain unavoidable. The fully vaccinated rate in numerous African countries is below 30%, even only 1% in Ethiopia (BBC, 2022). This is not only due to this region's low distribution of vaccines. In November 2021, the Chinese President, Xi-Jinping, promised to donate 600 million vaccine doses to African countries and 400 million doses jointly produced by Chinese companies and African countries (Bloomberg, 2021). African countries have also started receiving vaccines in July and August 2021 through bilateral schemes, donations, and the Covax Facility (Schraer, 2021). Nevertheless, the slow progress of vaccination in Africa is also led by several other factors such as the lack of health facilities, lack of training funds for medical personnel to accelerate the vaccination process in Africa, the difficulty of reaching rural areas to distribute the vaccines as well as technology and internet issues for African society to register themselves to get vaccine injection (Mwai, 2021).

G. Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic plays an important role in shaping G20's new identity as a leading actor in global health governance. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic that severely affected global health and the economy has induced the G20 to take health policies, particularly regarding vaccine distribution. With respect to that, Indonesia has an opportunity to contribute to shaping the identity of the G20 as a global health actor. Before the COVID-19 Pandemic, the G20 included the health sector as one of its agendas. However, after the spread of COVID-19 to all countries worldwide, the G20 has significantly contributed to global health management to mitigate the pandemic. During the presidency of Saudi Arabia and Italy in 2020 and 2021, respectively, the G20 used to put the global health system as one of its concerns. Global Health Summit that G20 and European Commission held in 2021 is also important in forming G20 identity as a prominent global health actor. The priority issue of creating global health architecture proposed by the Indonesian government shows the

commitment of the G20 to creating a healthy world. Hence, G20 can be an alternative or complement to global health governance and the WHO, especially considering that the G20 encompasses 19 countries with considerable power and high GDP growth worldwide.

The Indonesian government is expected to maintain the previous positive trends of the G20 member countries. Moreover, Indonesia might invigorate the G20 to form specific programs that organize donations and funding from member countries to increase the institution's role in global health governance. Furthermore, in the light of some other facts that cause vaccination gaps in low- and middle-income countries, as well as most of the G20 member countries, contribute to supply the vaccines, Indonesia might motivate the G20 leaders to increase assistance in the form of other COVID-19 tools such as therapeutics, diagnostics, and health systems.

Indonesia may also urge the G20 to form a Nationally Determined Contribution mechanism that stipulates that all member countries should contribute to mitigating COVID-19 and improving the global health system, based on each country's decision and ability. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) uses the nationally Determined Contribution mechanism to tackle the escalating climate crisis. The Paris Agreement Article 4 Paragraph 2 informs that 'each party shall prepare, communicate, and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. In addition, parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures to achieve the objectives of such contributions' (UNFCCC, 2015). By determining each member country's contribution, the G20 is expected to solve health problems mainly caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This instrument can also ensure that each member country has a role in mitigating COVID-19 and improving the global health system. Nonetheless, Indonesia can continue to be significantly involved in G20 health programs even after its tenure. Indonesia can be a representative that voices the health problems in developing and underdeveloped countries that need to be addressed by global leaders.

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